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An expected outcome from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX, hereafter] was to improve the 
overall quality of financial reporting in the U.S.  However, many believe the incr ased 
regulations imposed excessive costs on companies with little improvement in financial 
reporting quality.  SOX may have also imposed costs on U.S. investors by limiting the r 
investment choices in foreign companies listed on U.S. exchanges.  SOX applies to a l 
publicly-traded companies, including foreign companies that cross list on U.S. 
exchanges.  Immediately following SOX, the number of companies choosing to cross list 
in the U.S. declined significantly (Piotroski and Srinivasan 2008), but to the extent that 
SOX resulted in companies with lower quality earnings choosing to cross list elsewh re, 
the additional costs to U.S. investors – limiting foreign investment choices – may be 
worthwhile. Overall, I find SOX had no definitive influence on the earnings quality of 
cross-listers both in the U.S. and globally. My results indicate that SOX has had a greater 
influence on domestic U.S. companies’ earnings quality compared to cross-listers in the 
U.S. While I do find earnings quality is higher for cross-listers in the U.S. versus 
elsewhere, the earnings quality for neither group improved around SOX. Overall, my 
results suggest the costs from SOX exceed the benefits from improved reporting quality, 
at least as it relates to cross-listers. Further, my findings are consistent with criticisms of 
the bonding hypothesis.  While some may believe that cross-listed companies are 
bonding themselves to U.S. regulations and reporting quality, the evidence in this paper 
suggest that regulations do not equally impact U.S. companies and foreign companies 





The purpose of this study is to examine whether SOX was beneficial in terms of 
improving financial reporting quality – a major tenet of the 2002 legislation.  The context 
of my paper focuses directly upon the earnings quality of cross-listers around the 
enactment of SOX.  More specifically, I choose to focus on the earnings quality of a 
company in the initial  year of cross listing with the intent that such a focus would more 
directly assess the influence SOX had on the types of companies (in terms of earnings 
quality) that decide to cross list in the U.S.  An improvement in the quality of listings 
attracted by the U.S. market post-SOX would provide some indication on the 
effectiveness of the legislation, but was this expected improvement in earnings quality 
significant enough to overcome the cost of deterring companies from listing in the U.S.?  
Nordberg (2008) argues that SOX is ineffective as the remedies of the legislation did not 
match the ailments of the U.S. markets but at the same time argues the detriments of SOX 
(e.g., the loss in competitiveness of U.S. markets) are over-stated.  Thus, the effectiveness 
of SOX continues to be an empirical question, and one way to examine SOX is to 
determine the effectiveness of its provisions on earnings quality for companies in the 
initial year of cross listing. 
As the landscape of international business has changed in the past twenty years, 
companies worldwide have expanded operations beyond domestic borders in order to 
increase their investor and consumer bases.1  To gain additional access to new markets, 
companies also choose to cross list on foreign exchanges in more developed financial 
markets.  Historically, U.S. exchanges were the most sought after by fo eign companies 
                                                
1 Meek and Thomas (2004) discuss the growing importance of four international factors:  (1) the expansio  
of equity and bond markets globally, (2) an increased number of cross-listing companies, (3) the influence 
of the IASB and IFRS, and (4) the influence of multina ionals and foreign direct investment.  
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given the attractiveness of the U.S. economy.  Listing on U.S. exchanges resulted in 
increased visibility and reputation, greater liquidity, and the ability to raise capital at a 
lower cost (Licht 2003).  However, recent changes in the U.S. regulatory environment 
may influence the cross-listing decision.  The more rigorous requirements from Sarbanes-
Oxley, which applies to any publicly traded company in the U.S., may have shifted t e 
cross-listing trend towards non-U.S. exchanges.  Prior to SOX, nine out of every ten 
cross-listers did so in the U.S., but that ratio shifted to one out of ten by 2005 (Karmin 
and Lucchetti 2006).  While recent evidence suggests that the cross-listing trend away 
from U.S. markets has partially subsided, the form of U.S. cross listings which companies 
now utilize suggests the documented decline shortly after SOX is indicative of foreign 
companies avoiding the U.S. markets.2 
Recent research indicates that companies have adopted avoidance strategie to 
evade increased costs associated with SOX by going private and/or delisting from U.S. 
exchanges (Engel et al. 2007; Hotsak et al. 2007; and Witmer 2005).  An additional 
strategy for U.S. and non-U.S. companies is choosing to cross list on non-U.S. 
exchanges.  Not only are the actual dollar costs to implement SOX significant, but the 
increased level of financial reporting and accountability is also an additional cost for 
many foreign companies.  Therefore, foreign companies with lower-quality e rnings 
(e.g., companies with greater earnings management) may find it less beneficial to cross 
list in the U.S.  To examine this supposition, I compare the earnings quality of foreign 
companies that decide to cross list in the U.S. via American Depository Receipts [ADRs, 
hereafter] versus those that cross list in non-U.S. markets via a form of global depository 
                                                
2 For further discussion on the cross-listing trends, see Section 2.3. 
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receipts [GDRs, hereafter] around the enactment of SOX.3  As previously mentioned, I 
specifically examine ADRs and GDRs in the initial year of cross listing (as opposed to 
cross-listers who have been on an exchange for many years).  While examining the 
change in earnings quality around SOX for existing cross-listers may provide some 
insight into the influence of SOX, ultimately these ADRs have little choice but comply 
with the new legislation because the choice to de-list in the face of increased rgulations 
may be too costly.  However, foreign companies attempting to make a decision on where 
to cross list may view the significant costs associated with SOX as a deterrent.  
Therefore, testing the impact of SOX on earnings quality in the initial year of cross listing 
provides unique and direct insight into the impact of the new regulations on the cross-
listing decision as companies weigh the benefits of a U.S. listing versus the dollar costs 
and increased reporting scrutiny and transparency associated with SOX. 
The enactment of SOX in 2002 came with much controversy.  The regulation was 
triggered by a series of market events, including the failures of Enron and Worl com.  
The result was legislation pertaining to any company under the purview of the Securities 
Acts of 1933 and 1934, specifically including any foreign company that lists on public 
exchanges in the U.S.4  Many believe these failures prior to SOX resulted from a lack of 
enforcement of existing laws and regulations, and proponents also claim the legislation 
was necessary to restore investor confidence and would prove to be beneficial in the 
long-term, despite the initial compliance costs.  The biggest complaint regarding SOX 
focused on this last point, as costs have proven to be substantial, allegedly damaging the 
                                                
3 As discussed in Section 2, I use the term GDR to include all cross listings on non-U.S. exchanges. 
4 Few exceptions exist for foreign filers under SOX.  SEC exemptions include audit committee 




competitiveness of U.S. markets.  Further, many believe that the remedies prescribed by 
SOX did not match the ailments as it relates to valuation and corporate governance 
(Brown and Caylor 2006; Bebchuk et al. 2009).   
As the debate regarding the effectiveness of SOX continues, I attempt to provide 
some evidence about the influence the legislation had on financial reporting.  A main 
function of SOX, in light of past corporate scandals, is to improve quality and 
transparency in financial reporting through enhanced rules and regulations (U.S. 
Congress 2002).  The focus of my first two hypotheses is on SOX and the direct impa
of the regulations on earnings quality for ADRs.  This is appropriate given the direct 
influence SOX (as well as the SEC) has on any company listed in the U.S., including 
ADRs.  The first hypothesis addresses the predicted improvement in earnings quality for 
ADRs, while the second hypothesis compares the improvement for ADRs with a matched 
sample of U.S. companies that are also subject to SOX’s provisions.  In one respect, 
because ADRs originate from local reporting environments where reporting sta dards are 
more lax, ADRs’ earnings quality has more room for improvement.  Alternatively, ADRs 
may be less sensitive to regulatory requirements,5 and thus, U.S. companies’ earnings 
quality may improve while ADRs’ earnings quality is unchanged.   
I also want to compare how earnings quality has improved for ADRs versus other 
foreign companies, but what is less apparent is the influence SOX has on other foreign 
companies.  Thus, my third hypothesis compares the earnings quality of ADRs and GDRs 
in the post-SOX period.  I predict that the increased regulation and enforcement from 
SOX discourages foreign companies with lower-quality earnings from c ss listing in the 
                                                
5 An ADR’s response to regulatory requirements like SOX is dependent upon how a cross-lister “bonds” 
with their new reporting regime.  A discussion of bnding is included further in the Introduction as well as 
a more thorough description in Section 3.1.  
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U.S.; therefore, foreign companies choosing to cross list in the U.S. have higher earnings 
quality than companies choosing to cross list elsewhere.  I also predict SOX deters lower-
quality companies from cross listing in the U.S., so I examine changes in earnings quality 
for GDRs.  The first question addresses whether earnings quality has improved for GDRs 
post-SOX.  The possibility exists that lower-quality would-be-ADRs are choosing to 
cross list on non-U.S. exchanges, thus decreasing the earnings quality of GDRs overall. 
Alternatively, if ADRs generally have higher-quality earnings than other cross-listers, 
then would-be-ADRs that instead list elsewhere might still increase the overall earnings 
quality of GDRs.  The second research question compares GDRs to a sample of foreign 
companies that choose not to cross list.  SOX should have limited influence on those 
companies that decide not to cross list; however, the same may not be true for for ign 
companies that desire a dual listing (i.e., GDRs). 
To test the earnings quality around SOX of foreign companies that choose to 
cross list in the U.S. versus other countries, I employ a similar methodology as used by 
Leuz et al. (2003) and Lang et al. (2003b).  The former examines the quality of earnings 
across 31 countries, and the latter compares the earnings quality of cross-listed 
companies in the U.S. versus non-cross-listed companies in their home country.  The 
term “earnings quality” can take on various related meanings, but in the context of these 
papers (as well as mine) earnings quality is best defined as how well a company’s 
reported earnings closely resembles earnings that are not manipulated by managers for 
private gain.  To compare particular elements of earnings quality, these papers compare 
measures for earnings management, earnings smoothing, timely loss rec gnition, and 
value relevance.  A multitude of statistics across these categories exist, and I use seven 
6 
 
statistics that are the most appropriate for my sample of cross-lister and would also 
provide a better indication of higher quality earnings.  My sample period covers initial 
cross-listers from 1998 through 2006 with a final sample consisting of 287 ADRs and 
393 GDRs from eight non-U.S. exchanges. 
My first set of results provides evidence that SOX has had limited impact on the 
quality of cross-listers’ earnings.  ADRs’ earnings quality around SOX actually declined, 
while earnings quality for a matched sample of U.S. companies increased.  Further, I find 
no evidence of an increase in earning quality for ADRs in the post-SOX period when 
comparing earnings quality prior to listing to the initial year of listing, nor does earnings 
quality improve for ADRs as they become more accustomed to SOX’s regulations.  
These combined results suggest SOX is not influencing the earnings quality of ADRs – a 
finding consistent with opponents of the bonding hypothesis.  As proposed by Coffee 
(1999, 2002), the bonding hypothesis states that cross-listers “bond” themselves to 
another market via increased voluntary disclosures as well as compliance with laws and 
regulations of the new market.  Siegel (2005) argues that reputational bonding can exist 
as foreign companies may benefit from cross listing based upon reputational factors that 
come with an increased following; however, the latter component of the bonding 
hypothesis which he labels “legal bonding” does not hold for cross-listers.  The evidence 
from Siegel (2005) suggests that the risk of SEC enforcement against cross-lister  in the 
U.S. is very low, and hence, he raises doubts about the amount of legal bonding that 
occurs for cross-listers.  If the maintained assumption of SOX is that earnings quality 
should improve for all U.S.-listed companies, the lack of improvement by ADRs is 
consistent with ADRs not legally bonding to U.S. markets, especially post-SOX. 
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My second set of results then focuses on how the earnings quality of those 
companies choosing to cross list on non-U.S. exchanges relates to my findings for ADRs.  
While ADRs did not improve in earnings quality around SOX, I provide evidence they 
have higher earnings quality than GDRs both before and after SOX.  Yet, for cross-listers 
in general, I find the change in earnings quality for ADRs around SOX is not
significantly different from the change in earnings quality for GDRs.  Finally, the change 
in earnings quality around SOX is greater for GDRs than for a matched sample of foreign 
companies that choose not to cross list.  In total, I find that SOX had a significant mpact 
on U.S. domestic companies but no impact on ADRs, GDRs, or those foreign non-cross-
listers.  
The effectiveness of SOX can be evaluated in many respects, but ultimately the 
legislation was enacted to increase the confidence of investors in U.S. markets.  In thi  
paper, I make three contributions related to the impact of SOX.  The many components of 
SOX including auditor oversight, executive responsibility, and internal control 
documentation all point to an outcome of improved financial reporting via greater 
financial transparency and enhanced financial disclosures.  Public companies in the U.S. 
have few strategies available to them to evade compliance with SOX (besides de-listing), 
but foreign companies have alternatives.  As foreign exchanges and the world economy 
have continued to develop, companies can raise additional capital outside their home 
country and increase overall reputation by cross listing on non-U.S. exchanges.  Changes 
in cross-listing trends post-SOX suggest non-U.S. exchanges are obtaining a greater 
number of foreign cross-listers.  Given the U.S. market has always been associated with 
higher-quality financial reporting (especially post-SOX), one outcome from the enhanced 
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financial reporting associated with SOX is to deter foreign companies that are unwilling 
to comply with increased levels of transparency and disclosure.  Therefore, the first 
contribution of my paper is to understand the impact of SOX on the cross-listing decision 
by examining companies’ earnings quality immediately after cross listing, and my 
findings suggest that SOX had limited influence.  Consistent with the claimby Doidge et 
al. (2008) that SOX did not affect foreign filers more than other companies, I find SOX 
did not have a greater differential impact on foreign companies compared with U.S. 
companies (and actually had the opposite effect).  
An outcome of the first contribution is that my results also provide further 
evidence that the bonding hypothesis may hold in terms of reputation by providing a 
sense of improved investor protection, but legally, foreign companies cross listing in he 
U.S. are not concerned with SOX compliance, consistent with suggestions by Siegel 
(2005).  Given the supposed increase in enforcement accompanying SOX, a reasonbl  
expectation would be that ADRs that generally originate from environments with weaker 
corporate governance would have shown improved earnings quality if compliance was a 
significant concern.  Contrary to this conjecture, the earnings quality of ADRs remained 
unchanged.  
 Finally, as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and other organizations work towards one global 
set of generally accepted accounting principles, evidence from this paper corroborates 
with existing evidence that the quality of earnings for foreign companies (cro s-listers 
and non-cross-listers) is less than that of U.S. companies.  Further, SOX has incresed th  
disparity given its significantly greater incremental impact on U.S. companies versus all 
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other samples examined in this paper.  As a result, the recent decision by the SEC 
allowing foreign companies with U.S. listed securities to report results underIFRS 
without reconciling to U.S. GAAP is of concern.  Undoubtedly, the transition to one set 
of global standards, including U.S. companies, would reduce the complexity as well
costs for reporting; however, as the IASB attempts to make financial reporting more 
consistent and reliable, more stringent enforcement may be necessary to make foreign 
companies’ earnings quality more comparable to that of U.S. companies. 
  Section 2 of the paper discusses the institutional background with respect to the 
cross-listing process and SOX.  Section 3 examines previous literature that leads to my 
hypotheses.  Section 4 explains the methodology, test statistics, and sample construction 
of the paper, as well as a brief discussion on existing cross-listing trends specific to my 
sample and their relation to the hypotheses.  Section 5 discusses the main results. Section 
6 provides some sensitivity analyses.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Background 
 This paper compares the earnings quality of companies that cross list in the U.S. 
versus non-U.S. exchanges around the enactment of SOX, and in this section I highlight 
the two key components of related literature.  First, I discuss the cross-listing process via 
depository receipts both in the U.S. and globally.  Second, I highlight the impact of SOX 




2.1. ADRs and GDRs6 
The majority of cross-listings by foreign companies have historically occurred in 
the U.S. via ADRs.  ADRs are negotiable instruments issued by a depository bank in the 
U.S. at the request of a foreign company – outlined in Figure 1.7  The cross-listing 
company exclusively negotiates an agreement with a depository bank in the U.S. and 
provides existing domestic shares to the depository who then issues depository receipts to 
investors on the selected U.S. exchange based upon a specified ADR ratio.8  ADRs are 
like U.S. stocks in that they are traded, quoted, and pay dividends in U.S. dollars.  In the 
U.S., companies can choose between three levels of public offerings – Level I, Level II, 
and Level III – or a private offering under SEC Rule 144A Depository Receipts 
(RADRs).  The four types vary in degree of compliance with SEC registration nd GAAP 
requirements with Levels II and III receiving the most scrutiny. 
Level I ADRs are the easiest and least costly listing for foreign companies to gain 
access to U.S. markets, but they cannot be used to raise new capital.  These ADRs trade 
on the OTC market and have limited SEC requirements as they are exempt from filing 
periodic reports or reconciling to U.S. GAAP under SEC reporting rule 12g 3-2(b).  The 
only SEC filing requirement is an F-6 SEC form to announce the ADR program.  Level II 
and Level III ADRs are listed on major U.S. exchanges and have stringent reporting 
                                                
6 Both Desai (2004), Cross-Border Listings and Depository Receipts, and an overview of depository 
receipts by the Bank of New York at http://www.adrbny.com/dr_edu_basics_and_benefits.jsp provide more 
in-depth discussion pertaining to ADRs and the various forms of GDRs.  
7 The ADR defined here is specifically identified as a Sponsored ADR, where an agreement exists between 
a foreign company and a depository bank.  Intermediary banks distribute Unsponsored ADRs, generally as 
a response to investor demand and not from the foreign company itself.  Unsponsored ADRs can only be 
traded via pink sheets (over-the-counter).  However, after the SEC introduced further disclosures for these 
unsponsored listings beginning in 1982, the number of Unsponsored ADRs has declined and the amount is 
now negligible (Desai, 2004). 
8 Intermediary banks use these ratios to best align the price of the ADR with an appropriate price in the
cross-listed market.  For example, one depository receipt would consist of five depository shares if the ratio 
were 1:5.   
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requirements similar to that of domestic companies.  These two ADR types are very 
similar with the main distinguishing factor being Level IIs are tied o previously issued 
shares abroad while Level IIIs are used to raise capital through the issuance of new 
shares.  In addition, both must file F-6 forms to announce the program and reconcile their 
financial reports to U.S. GAAP on an annual basis.9  Finally, RADRs are another way in 
which foreign companies can issue new equity to raise cash in the U.S. but with fewer 
reporting requirements.  These ADRs utilize the PORTAL market to attract qu lified 
institutional buyers (QIBs) for private placement.  In this market, QIBs can buy and sell 
RADRs to one another.  This type of depository receipt does not require registration with 
the SEC or any reconciliation of their financial reports to U.S. GAAP. 
Each type of ADR listing brings particular costs and benefits to the cross-listing 
company.  Level I and 144a ADRs avoid the scrutiny of the SEC, and thus are less costly 
and easy to complete.  The downside for these ADRs is that they do not necessarily 
provide a signal to investors that the company is willing to comply with regulations that 
provide greater investor protection.  Companies choosing to cross list via Level II and 
Level III ADRs do provide such a signal, but complying with the stringent SEC reporting 
requirements can be costly and time-consuming.  In this paper, I focus on the Level II and 
III ADRs because they provide a direct examination of the benefits that a listing in the 
U.S. can bring, including increased visibility and prestige and a larger shareholder base. 
Turning to cross-listings on non-U.S. exchanges, I categorize all non-U.S. cross-
listings as GDRs for simplicity, although my GDR sample actually includes thr e major 
types of foreign cross-listings – GDRs, European Depository Receipts (EDRs), and 
                                                
9 My sample period ends in 2006, thus the new SEC rule waiving the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP by 
foreign companies using IFRS would not influence the results of my study. 
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International Depository Receipts (IDRs).  GDRs are specifically cross-listings on non-
U.S. exchanges that are denominated in U.S. dollars.  EDRs are the same as GDRs except 
they are denominated in Euros, and IDRs are issued by non-European companies in 
Brussels.  Various levels of GDRs do not exist like ADRs in the U.S, and the listing
requirements and scrutiny imposed upon cross-listers may vary by country and exchange.  
The process of issuing GDRs is operationally similar to ADRs as the depository receipts 
are held by a foreign branch of an international bank who issues the receipts in their 
respective country.  Other branches of the bank can make their GDRs available globa ly 
as well.   
2.2. Sarbanes-Oxley 
President George W. Bush signed The Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act of 2002, more familiarly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, on 
July 30, 2002.  At the time, the President described the Act as “the most far reaching 
reform of American business practices since Franklin D. Roosevelt.”  Some label the Act 
as a “one size fits all” regulation which proposes sweeping changes but whose 
implications are still being determined.  The intent of the new regulation is to retore 
investor confidence in the U.S. capital market through increased investor protection by 
enhancing financial reporting disclosures.  Some of the key components to SOX include 
the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 
enhanced auditor independence, greater corporate responsibility including audit 
committee guidelines and CEO and CFO certification of all periodic financial statements, 
and enhanced financial disclosure.  Other sections address analysts’ conflicts f interest 
as well as the accountability of management and auditors for fraud and the related
13 
 
punishment for SOX violations.  Ultimately, the SEC is responsible for implementing all 
rulings on the compliance of SOX by each company.   
SOX introduced many changes to financial reporting in the U.S., and the debate 
continues regarding the benefits the regulation has brought to the U.S. economy.  The 
speed with which Congress put the Act together raised concerns regarding its 
effectiveness and the impact it would have on companies, most particularly the extra 
costs incurred to remain compliant with the new rules.  Still, many believed SOX was 
necessary and useful to ease concerns regarding the reliability of financial reporting, and 
many commentaries on SOX cite obvious inadequacies in financial reporting that existed 
prior to 2002.  Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) argue that the new regulation addresses 
some of the deficiencies that existed in corporate governance, and Coates (2007) claims 
that while many of the rules of corporate governance addressed in SOX existed prior to 
the malfeasance by Tyco, WorldCom, and Enron, the enforcement of these rules was 
obviously missing.10  Trends such as a rise in accounting restatements, an increase in 
earnings management from 1987 to 2001, a decline in investor confidence, an increase in 
audit failures, and a rise in securities frauds are indicative of the need for enhanc d 
regulation (Coates, 2007).  These studies conclude that SOX will bring net benefits that 
will make the U.S. reporting system better.  With that said, Holmstrom and Kaplan 
(2003) conclude that the biggest risk remaining in the post-SOX era is the possibility of 
over-regulation. 
Critics of SOX claim the new regulation is excessive and results in unnecessary 
costs.  Romano (2005) is very blunt in her commentary on SOX calling the “quack” 
                                                
10 SOX picks up many tenets of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), thus large portions of 
the legislation are not new.  The failure of the FCPA was related more to lack of enforcement. 
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corporate governance provisions having more to do with recycled ideas and less about 
addressing inefficiencies.  She states, “Simply put, the corporate governanc provisions 
were not a focus of careful deliberations by Congress. SOX was emergency legislation, 
enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media frenzy involving 
several high-profile corporate fraud and insolvency cases” (pg. 1528).  Engel et al. (2006) 
discuss the potential drivers of compliance costs from SOX that companies consider 
when making listing decisions:  internal control reports, documentation and legal 
requirements, external assistance to prepare financial statements, ex cutive certifications 
requiring more of their time, and greater civil and criminal penalties resulting in a 
demand for higher wages.  Many generally consider SOX Section 404 addressing 
improved internal controls as the primary cause of increased costs.  For companies to 
maintain compliance, they have had to consume more internal resources as well as rely 
on the assistance of external parties (like auditors), both of which substantially i crease 
costs to companies.  A 2006 survey of 247 executives by the FEI showed that total 2005 
costs for compliance with Section 404 averaged $3.8 million per company and was 
directly proportional to the size of the company.  Further, 85.1% of the respondents 
believe the costs for internal control compliance exceed the benefits (FEI, 2006).   
2.3. Combining the Cross-listing Decision with SOX 
Of particular interest to this paper is the influence of SOX on foreign companies.  
The international reaction to the new reporting requirements was not positive, given the 
“heavy-handed, extra-territorial nature” of the legislation on foreign companies 
(Nordberg, 2008).  Some companies sought exemptions from SOX provisions via the 
SEC but such calls were resisted.  Ultimately, some exemptions were provided to foreign 
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companies listed in the U.S., such as the audit committee independence requirements.  
Also, the deadline for the costly compliance with Section 404 was extended to fiscal 
years ending on or after December 15, 2007.  Still, cross-listing trends around the 
enactment of SOX suggest a change in where foreign companies decide to cross list.  
The globalization of markets and the growth of exchanges in Europe, 
accompanied with increased costs incurred by companies to comply with SEC standards 
at the turn of the century, were already raising doubts about the necessity of a l sting in 
the U.S. (Bancel and Mittoo 2001); however, organizations like the Committee on 
Capital Market Regulation and the Financial Executives International (FEI), amongst 
others, point to the enactment of SOX in 2002 as the ultimate culprit.  A significant 
reason for the shift in recent cross listing trends away from the U.S. is the increase in 
costs for issuing shares in the U.S. in the post SOX era (Karmin and Lucchetti, 2006).  
The Committee is specifically concerned that “excessive regulation, problematic 
implementation and unwarranted litigation – particularly when occurring simultaneously 
– make U.S. capital markets less attractive and, therefore, less competitive wi h other 
financial centers around the world” (Committee 2006, 2007).11  They provide evidence 
that in 2005, 5% of the value of global initial public offerings was raised in the U.S., 
down from 50% in 2000.  Further, the U.S. share of global market capitalization was at a 
seventeen-year low of 35.2% in 2007 (37.9% in 2006 and 52% in 2001).  Foreign 
exchanges have taken advantage of this opportunity to attract companies to their mark t 
by promoting cheaper listings, as well as lower regulatory and disclosure req irements.  
                                                
11 The Committee on Capital Market Regulation is comprised of 22 individuals from the investor, finance, 
accounting, law and academic communities who describe themselves as a group “dedicated to improving 
the competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets by reducing regulation and litigation while enhancing the
rights of shareholders.”  They issued their first report in 2006, and a follow-up in 2007.  The Committee 
intends to follow the competitiveness of the capital m rkets for at least the next two years. 
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The AIM market in London, a newer exchange designed to attract mostly smaler, less-
profitable companies from developed countries, is doing exactly that. McLachlan (2006)
argues that “the burden of red tape is forcing publicly traded companies to abandon Wall 
Street in favour of the London Stock Exchange.”  U.S. cross-listings have declined 63% 
in the post-SOX era, while listings on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) have increased 
over 100% due to a seven-fold increase in AIM listings (Piotroski and Srinivasan 2008).  
At the same time, foreign delistings in the U.S. have increased (Hotsak et al. 2007 and 
Smith 2008).  A U.S. listing can still bring companies credibility, but given the incr ased 
regulatory and legal costs, the debate continues regarding the true net benefits from cross 
listing.12 
Overall, the effectiveness of SOX remains an empirical question and one that 
must be addressed in parts.  Nordberg (2008) argues that SOX is ineffective as the 
remedies of the legislation did not match the ailments of the U.S. markets; however, he 
also argues that the loss in competitiveness is over-stated.  One way to examine SOX is 
to determine the effectiveness of its provisions on earnings quality.  In the following 
section, I develop testable hypotheses that specifically examine the earnings quality of 
those cross-listers around SOX.  An improvement in the quality of listings would provide 
some indication on the effectiveness of the legislation.  The increased costs from SOX for 
listing in the U.S. can certainly deter foreign companies, but increased investor protection 
                                                
12 Recent evidence from Thomson Financial suggests the cross-listing trend has partially shifted back to the 
U.S. as foreign companies familiarize themselves with corporate governance rules under SOX.  The 
percentage of foreign-based IPOs in the U.S. increased in early 2007, but most IPOs were fairly small and
usually file via private placement (Rule 144A) which is not subject to SOX’s provisions.  I do not attempt 
to address the validity of this trend, but I do believe the decline in the competitiveness of the U.S. market as 





from SOX can also lead to net benefits if lower-quality companies are no longerdesirous 
of a U.S. listing. 
3. Hypothesis Development and Research Questions 
3.1. Discussion of the Cross-Listing Decision 
In choosing where to cross list, companies opt into corporate governance, 
disclosure standards, and accounting rules that are generally more rigorous than their own 
country’s.  One of the predominant arguments as to why companies cross list in the U.S. 
is their willingness to subject themselves to increased disclosure and stronger 
enforcement authorities, thus “bonding” themselves with a more regulated and litigious 
market (Coffee 2002). The belief is that cross listing provides a signal to investors that a 
company desires to compensate for the lack of investor protection in its home country 
(Coffee 1999; Stulz 2001).  Companies from poorer investor protection environments or 
weaker disclosure environments are more likely to cross list (Reese and Weisbach 2002; 
Hope et al. 2007).  The empirical evidence further suggests that cross-listed companies 
are valued more than their domestic counterparts and have a decreased cost of capital due 
to a decline in perceived market risk (Doidge et al. 2004; Errunza and Miller 2000; 
Karolyi 1998; and Hail and Leuz 2009).   
The bonding hypothesis (at least as it relates to U.S. markets) has its critics, and 
alternative theories exist as to why companies cross list.  Licht (2003) finds that U.S. 
authorities generally take a hands off approach to foreign filers with respect to enforcing 
corporate governance standards, and Siegel (2005) argues that while the “reputational 
bonding” of cross listing may be somewhat true, the “legal bonding” from cross listing 
does not hold due to the lack of SEC enforcement against cross-listing companies.   Lang 
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et al. (2006) find that the reconciled earnings of cross-listers are of lower-quality than 
that of U.S. domestic companies.  Further, earnings quality is lower for countries from 
weaker investor protection environments, suggesting that SEC regulation does not 
necessarily overcome the influence of the local environment.  Licht (2003) argues the 
bonding effect has been largely overstated.  As opposed to improving the scope of 
investor protection, cross-listers are more often motivated by ease of access to financing 
and increased visibility.  The result is a global pattern of cross listing associated with 
informational distance – geographically or culturally. 
Regardless of motivation, research has shown that companies generally benefit 
from cross listing in the U.S.  When companies make the commitment to cross list in the 
U.S., they generate positive abnormal returns, raise more capital, lower their cost of 
capital, and receive higher valuations (Doidge et al. 2009).  For an eleven-year period 
from 1985-1995, Miller (1999) documents positive abnormal returns in the company’s 
domestic market around the announcement to cross list.  Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find 
similar results around both the announcement and listing dates for companies cross li ting 
between 1976 and 1992.  These advantages illustrate that cross listing gives a foreign 
company access to more developed financial markets, resulting in increased visibility and 
reputation, greater liquidity, and the ability to raise capital at a lower cost (Lich , 2003).  
Evidence from Errunza and Miller (2000) speak directly to this assertion, as they 
document a 42.2% decline in cost of capital for cross-listers. 
   While the cross-listing literatures suggest that foreign companies benefit from 
listing in the U.S., the U.S. market also benefits from attracting companies from around 
the world.  The question remains - what influence did SOX have on the foreign 
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companies’ decision on where to cross list?  As previously discussed, SOX has been 
blamed by many as a leading disincentive to foreign companies desiring to cross list in 
the U.S.  A 2006 survey by Mazars (a Paris-based audit firm) shows 43% of European 
companies believe the costs of SOX will outweigh the benefits and 17% would consier 
delisting to escape the law; however, 72% of Asian and 81% South American companies 
believe benefits will exceed costs.  A majority of these costs related to SOX originate 
from compliance with Section 404 related to internal controls (as discussed previously).  
While Section 404 compliance was not required until the end of 2007, the evidence from 
this survey suggests foreign companies were anticipating these large costs and thus 
considered them in their cross-listing decision.  Further, Ling (2008) finds evidence 
suggesting costs to comply with disclosure and accounting standards is a significant 
component in the cross-listing decision for companies.  Some U.S. companies have 
adopted strategies such as going private to get around SOX costs (Engel et al., 2006). 
To further address the impact of SOX, I first examine whether earnings quality 
improved for foreign companies choosing to cross list in the U.S., as would be expected 
if SOX was effective in improving the quality of financial reporting for all U.S.-listed 
companies.  The subsequent hypotheses then address the types of companies SOX may
have deterred from cross listing in the U.S.  While the previously mentioned loss of U.S. 
listings by foreign companies may be of some concern, the fact remains that SOX may be 
effectively keeping lower-quality companies from cross listing in the U.S., which would 





3.2. Hypotheses for SOX and U.S.-listed Companies 
In this section, I primarily focus on SOX and the earnings quality of ADRs given 
the direct influence SOX has on companies listed in the U.S.  I first examine the change 
in earnings quality for ADRs around SOX.  Companies desiring to cross list in the U.S. 
are willing to incur greater financial costs as well as accept moretransparent financial 
reporting in order to access a more restrictive market, increase their investor base, raise 
more capital, and obtain access to a liquid secondary market.  Due to SOX, these costs 
and disclosure requirements increased.  Further, Cohen et al. (2008) show that earnings 
management by U.S. companies (not exclusive to cross-listers) increased steadily prior to 
SOX, especially the period immediately before SOX; however, earnings management 
trends show an abrupt reversal in the post-SOX period.  Lobo and Zhou (2006) also find 
that income-increasing earnings management declined after the SOX requirement for 
CEO/CFO certification of the financial statements.  Given a primary purpose of SOX was 
to improve financial reporting quality in the U.S. and some research suggests earnings 
quality has improved in the U.S. post-SOX, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H1:  Earnings quality increases in the post-SOX period for initial ADRs. 
 
Next, I compare the influence of SOX on ADRs versus a matched sample of U.S. 
companies.  Given SOX is applicable to all U.S.-listed companies, I would expect an 
improvement in earnings quality for U.S. companies, similar to what is proposed in H1 
for ADRs.  However, ADRs originate from different reporting environments than 
existing U.S. companies, so the question addressed in my second hypothesis is whether 
SOX increased earnings quality differentially for these two sets of companies.  One 
expectation is that the increased regulations from SOX should have a greater incremental 
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effect on those companies with weaker corporate governance (or investor protection) like 
ADRs whose home countries governance statutes are not as strong as those in the U.S.  
Companies that cross list in the U.S. tend to increase protection of minority shaeholders 
and improve corporate governance (Reese and Weisbach 2002; Fresard and Salva 2008; 
Hope et al. 2007).  This argument assumes the bonding of ADRs to the U.S. market is a 
legitimate signal, as these companies respond to the expected increase in financial
reporting quality from SOX; thus, ADRs’ earnings quality may improve more than that of 
U.S. companies.  Because U.S. companies are associated with higher earnings quality, 
ADRs may also have more “room” for improvement in terms of earnings quality in 
response to SOX.   
An alternative expectation follows from the lack of legal bonding argument 
mentioned previously.  If ADRs are cross listing in the U.S. only to benefit from the 
reputational gains and not legally bonding to the regulations in the U.S., then SOX should 
have limited influence on the earnings quality of ADRs, while at the same time U.S. 
companies’ earnings quality improves.  Depending upon whether ADRs are a sending a 
true signal regarding bonding with the U.S. market will dictate how SOX has 
differentially impacted earnings quality for ADRs and U.S. companies.  I therefor  
predict the following non-directional hypothesis: 
H2:  The change in earnings quality around SOX is different for initial ADRs 
than for U.S. companies. 
 
3.3. Hypothesis Comparing ADRs to GDRs 
Following upon the hypothesized improvement in earnings quality for ADRs, I 
also want to compare the quality of earnings for foreign companies cross listing in the 
U.S. versus those cross listing in non-U.S. markets.  Given the changing trend in where 
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companies cross list, I propose that characteristics of earnings between ADRs and GDRs 
differ.  Therefore, I want to examine the comparability of the quality of earnings for 
ADRs and GDRs in the post-SOX period when, as suggested by listing trends, foreign
companies began to more strongly consider listing on non-U.S. markets.  SOX increased 
costs for all U.S. companies, including ADRs which must meet essentially the same 
requirements as U.S. companies.  If the barriers truly have increased, then only those 
companies that believe cross listing benefits will outweigh higher costs will list in the 
U.S. 
Extant research has examined the quality of earnings for ADRs but only pre-SOX, 
while limited research exists for GDRs.   Lang et al. (2003b) shows that ADRs have 
higher quality earnings – more conservative, less earnings management, and i creased 
value relevance - compared to companies from the same country that do not cross list.  
Thus, some evidence exists indicating that ADRs have higher-quality earnings than other 
foreign companies.  Further, Leuz et al. (2003) support this conclusion as companies in 
the U.S. have less earnings management than any other country based upon their 
aggregate earnings management score.  These findings suggest the U.S. capital market is 
associated with higher-quality earnings, a conjecture supported by the size and historical 
attractiveness of the U.S. market.  Therefore, I propose the following: 
H3:  Earnings quality is higher in the post-SOX period for initial ADRs than 
for initial GDRs.  
 
3.4. Additional Research Questions Addressing the Earnings Quality for GDRs 
The influence of SOX on GDRs is more tenuous as compared to ADRs given 
SOX has no direct implications outside the U.S.  At the same time, the influence SOX 
has on the cross-listing decision may indirectly impact the earnings quality of GDRs.  
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While I expect the earnings quality of ADRs has improved post-SOX, several 
developments suggest GDRs earnings quality has declined over the same time period.  
Karolyi (1998) suggests that stringent disclosure requirements are the largest impediment 
to cross-listers.  With the enhanced disclosure requirements applicable to all U.S.-listed 
companies, those foreign companies with lower earnings quality that still desire to cross 
list (and might have done so in the U.S. prior to SOX) now may decide list outside the 
U.S., lowering the overall earnings quality of GDRs.  Similarly, foreign companies that 
de-list from a U.S. exchange to avoid more transparent financial reporting under SOX 
that subsequently cross list elsewhere may also lower the overall earnings quality of 
GDRs.   
The unstated assumption above is GDRs’ average earnings quality is declining 
due to lower-quality would-be-ADRs (or pre-existing ADRs) deciding to cross list 
outside the U.S.  An alternative explanation is that average earnings quality of GDRs is 
increasing based upon the fact that ADRs generally have higher earnings quality than do 
GDRs (Lang et al., 2003a).  The possibility exists that lower-quality ADRs (or again, 
would-be-ADRs) could possess higher-quality earnings than GDRs on average; thus, the 
hypothesized shift in cross listing results in an increase in average earnings quality for 
GDRs.  To determine what influence SOX may have on the initial cross-listing decision 
for companies, I propose the following non-directional research question: 
RQ1:  Does earnings quality change in the post-SOX period for initial 
GDRs? 
 
Second, I examine the earnings quality of GDRs versus that of foreign companies 
that decide not to cross list.  SOX most likely has limited influence on the level of 
regulation, litigation, and enforcement in other countries; therefore, I expect the earnings 
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quality of foreign non-cross-listers to remain unchanged.13  However, in discussing RQ1, 
I indicate how certain cross-listers and ADR de-listers that choose to cross list elsewhere 
can lead to either a decline or improvement in the earnings quality of GDRs.  Lang et l. 
(2003b) briefly discuss some alternative analyses comparing non-U.S. cross-listers and 
non-cross-listers, although they provide little explanation and their tests are in the pre-
SOX period.  To provide a more thorough examination of this comparison, I propose a 
second non-directional research question: 
RQ2:  Does earnings quality change more around SOX for initial GDRs than 
for foreign non-cross-listers? 
 
4. Sample, Research Design, and Methodology 
4.1. Sample Selection 
 I examine the earnings quality in the initial year of cross listing both before and 
after SOX.  The sample period covers nine years from 1998 – 2006.  SOX was enacted at 
the end of July 2002, with most provisions effective after 30 days.  Following Piotroski 
and Srinivasan (2008) who examine cross-listing trends around SOX, I exclude initial 
cross-listings between May 2002 and August 2002, during the legislative timeframe of 
the regulation.  Any company that initially cross lists via either an ADR or GDR prior to 
May 2002, I consider pre-SOX, and any initial cross listing after August 2002, I consider 
post-SOX.  Thus, both sub-samples include four years and four months of initial cross-
listers.   
                                                
13 One potential confounding effect may come from the implementation of “international” SOX in many 
countries.  For example, Japan enacted J-SOX in June 2006 and is a modification of U.S. SOX with a 
particular focus on internal controls over financial reporting.  The timing of similar international SOX 
regulations most likely has occurred at the end of my sample period or afterwards, but if companies (cross-
listers or non-cross-listers) anticipate new regulations, some changes to earnings quality may occur that are 
unrelated to U.S. my research question. 
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I obtain the sample of cross-listing companies for ADRs and GDRs separately.  
The Bank of New York, Citibank, and JP Morgan Chase sponsor over 90% of all ADRs, 
so I use the databases from each bank’s website to collect an initial set of ADRs.  The 
banks’ databases include the cross-listers’ names, ticker, depository receipt type (Levels 
I, II, or III), country of origin, DR ratio, effective date, and appropriate U.S. exchange on 
which the ADRs are traded.  In most cases, the banks’ lists include active companies 
only, so I capture other ADRs that have delisted or for some other reason are not in the 
banks’ lists directly from the U.S. exchanges’ (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) historical 
data on cross-listers.14  My primary tests include only Level II and Level III ADRs 
because Level I and privately placed ADRs are not required to meet the same level of 
financial reporting standards as domestic U.S. companies. 
 The process of identifying GDRs is more manually intensive.  No central banks 
dominate the sponsorship of cross-listers globally, so I rely upon data from multiple 
foreign exchanges.  The compilation of GDRs comes from eight of the largest non-U.S. 
exchanges in the world covering nine different countries:  London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
Main, LSE AIM, Toronto, NYSE Euronext (Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris), 
Luxembourg, Tokyo, Frankfurt, and Zurich.  The available data for cross-listers varies by 
exchange; however, I was able to collect 894 total GDRs prior to gathering the financial 
related data. 
Taking the list of cross-listers, I then merge the companies with financial ad 
price data from Compustat Global to construct the various earnings quality measures 
discussed in detail in the following sections.  Table 1, Panel A shows the final sample of 
                                                
14 The most comprehensive list amongst the exchanges came from the NYSE’s Listed Company Directory 
(http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/1997.html?ListedComp=NONUS&start=1&startlist=1&item=1&firstti
me=done) from which I focused on the Non-U.S. Listed Companies list. 
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cross-listers by year and exchange, as well as the sample totals prior to removing 
companies with missing financial variables.   The four key sub-samples are the pr  and 
post-SOX totals for ADRs and GDRs, and the sizes of each sub-sample speak directly to 
the global cross-listing trends.  Figure 2A compares total ADRs and GDRs over the 
sample period.  In total, initial ADRs have declined post-SOX while initial GDRs have 
increased.  ADRs specifically decline in 2002 after an increase in the previous two years.  
GDRs follow a similar pattern during the SOX release, suggesting some level of 
uncertainty for cross-listers; however, the post-SOX era shows a dramatic increase, 
mostly attributable to the LSE AIM exchange, as shown in Figure 2B.  Karmin and 
Lucchetti (2006) suggest that nine out of ten cross-listers do so in London or 
Luxembourg, and my sample supports their conjecture, as the three exchanges in London 
and Luxembourg all increase significantly post-SOX. 
In addition to where foreign companies choose to cross list, Panels B and C of 
Table 1 provide additional information regarding some demographics of my ADR and 
GDR samples.  Panel B shows the home countries for each of the sample ADR and GDR 
companies.  Both ADRs and GDRs are spread across companies from many countries.  
Pre-SOX, the largest number of ADRs originated from companies in Germany, Great 
Britain, France, and Netherlands, but on a relative basis, France and Great Britain show 
the largest decline in ADRs pre to post-SOX.  Pre-SOX GDRs were not dominated by a 
specific country, but post-SOX a large amount of initial GDRs originate from Australia, 
India, Taiwan, Great Britain and Ireland.  Only GDRs from Austria and the Netherlands 
showed a significant decline.  Besides possibly Great Britain and India, no direct 
indication of companies from a particular country leaving U.S. markets for other markets 
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exists.  Finally, Panel C shows the composition of ADR and GDR samples across 
industries is not dramatically different.  On a relative basis, ADRs are slightly more 
concentrated in the Finance and Transportation industries, and pre to post-SOX, the only
significant change was an increase in Mining companies.  Overall, the demographics in 
Table 1 Would not suggest a significant influence from a particular country or industry 
on my results.15 
4.2. Test Statistics and Methodology 
 The research design used to examine the hypotheses and research questions is a 
series of comparisons (e.g., ADRs vs. GDRs) of earnings quality statistics similar to that 
employed by Lang et al. (2003, 2006), Leuz et al. (2003), and others.  Table 2 
summarizes the seven earnings quality statistics used for the comparisons nd their 
calculation.  For all statistics, with the exception of the measures of small loss avoidance, 
a higher number signifies higher earnings quality.  I categorize these statistics into 
earnings management, timely loss recognition, or value relevance statistics.  Each statistic 
measures an element of earnings quality with the expectation that the setof measures as a 
whole would provide some indication of higher quality when comparing two separate 
sub-samples of companies.  For some of the hypotheses I compare the levels of the 
earnings quality statistics (e.g. Post-SOX ADRs vs. Post-SOX GDRs), while for others I 
compare the changes in earnings quality statistics around SOX.16  The comparability 
                                                
15 Where applicable, I ran regressions for the earnings quality statistics (discussed in Section 4.2) using 
country and industry fixed effects in order to contr l for any significant influence from either of these two 
factors, and my results remain unchanged. 
16 Note the changes analyses I run are not a within company change over time as is traditional in many 
studies.  My focus is on earnings quality in the first year of cross listing; therefore, I compare the c ange 
between initial cross-listers in the pre-SOX period t  initial cross-listers in the post-SOX period. 
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between earnings measures and across countries could be an issue; thus, the changes 
analyses are helpful to hold differences in characteristics between sub-samples constant. 
The first set of earnings quality statistics addresses the proclivity of cross-listers 
to manage earnings.  The first statistic (EQ1) examines earnings smoothing where 
managers use their discretion via accruals to reduce the variability of reported ea nings.  I 
measure the variability of earnings using the standard deviation of operating income (OI), 
scaled by the standard deviation of operating cash flows (OCF).17  Scaling by operating 
cash flows will provide some control for the variability in economic performance.  A 
lower EQ1 implies greater discretion by managers to smooth operating performance; 
therefore, a higher ratio signifies less earnings smoothing. 
The previous measure indirectly assumes the influence of accruals to manipulate 
performance.  My second statistic (EQ2), the correlation of operating accruals with 
operating cash flows, more directly measures the use of accruals by managers as a means 
of earnings management.  Managers can use accruals to smooth cash flow fluctuations 
reflected in earnings, and companies that use larger amounts of accruals are more likely 
to have earnings that are manipulated by managers.  Following Dechow et al. (1995), I 
calculate the accruals portion of earnings (ACCR) as: 
ACCRit = (∆CAit – ∆Cashit) – (∆CLit – ∆STDit – ∆TPit) - Depit, 
where ∆CA is the change in current assets, ∆Cash is the change in cash and equivalents, 
∆CL is the change in current liabilities, ∆STD is the change in short-term debt in current 
liabilities, ∆TP is the change in taxes payable, and Dep is depreciation and amortization 
                                                
17 Most companies in Compustat Global have reported OCF; however, for company-years where OCF is 
missing, I calculate the variable as the difference between net income and accruals.  
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expense.  I calculate EQ2 as the correlation in the residuals of accruals (ACCR) and the 
residuals of operating cash flows (OCF) from the following regression: 
ACCRit or OCFit =  + β1 CONTROLSit + εit, 
where CONTROLS are those documented by Pagano et al. (2002) that influence the 
cross-listing decision:  size (SIZE), growth (SGROW), leverage (LVG), capital intensity 
(AST_TURN), and equity and debt issuances (EQISS and DEBTISS).  These measures 
are also included to capture economic differences in the comparative samples.  While the 
nature of accrual accounting results in a negative correlation, a larger negative correlation 
between the residuals from the accruals and operating cash flows indicates managers use 
accruals more in order to smooth earnings.  Therefore, a higher (or less negative) 
correlation represents higher earnings quality. 
 A series of research shows how managers can manipulate earnings to achieve
thresholds.  Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence that management uses 
discretion to avoid small losses.  My third earnings management statistic (EQ3) captures 
this tendency of small loss avoidance.  I classify net income scaled by lagged total assets 
between [-0.025, 0) as a small loss and those between [0, 0.025] as a small profit.18  T  
identify small loss avoidance, I include two versions of EQ3.  The first uses the following 
logistic regression,  
smallprofitit =  + β1 SUBit + β2 CONTROLSit + εit, 
                                                
18 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) amongst others measuring small loss avoidance have used an interval of 
(-0.01, 0] as opposed to (-0.025, 0] to represents small losses as well as the corresponding small profits.  To 
my knowledge, no specific interval width is more appropriate to measure small losses and small profits.  
Thus, based upon my analysis of the variability of earnings for my various sub-samples, I use a slightly 
larger interval.  The use of smaller interval widths obviously results in a larger preponderance of small loss 
avoidance, but the comparisons across sub-samples proposed in the hypotheses remain unchanged. 
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where companies with small profits (smallprofitit) as defined above are coded as 1 (or 0 
otherwise), the indicator variable (SUB) is coded as 1 for the sub-sample of int rest 
depending upon the hypothesis examined (e.g., POST when comparing post-ADRs to 
pre-ADRs) (or 0 otherwise), and CONTROLS as defined previously.  The coefficient on 
SUB () represents the tendency of managers to avoid losses for the sub-sample of 
interest, where a positive (negative) coefficient indicates a greater (lesser) likelihood of 
loss avoidance and hence lower (higher) earnings quality.  For ease of interpreta ion, I 
also use the ratio of the number of small profits to small losses as a second measure of 
small loss avoidance.  A smaller ratio represents less loss avoidance and h nce higher 
earnings quality.19  The inclusion of this ratio is also necessary when comparing the 
changes in loss avoidance from pre to post-SOX, as the previous measure of loss 
avoidance cannot be utilized in a difference-in-differences approach.  Combined, the two 
smoothing measures (EQ1 and EQ2) and the two measures of small loss avoidance (EQ3) 
should provide consistent evidence to determine which sub-samples tend to manage 
earnings more. 
Another measure of earnings quality is the timely recognition of losses which
motivates my second category of earnings quality.  In the context of my study, the 
willingness of companies to recognize losses immediately as opposed to spreading them 
over several years signifies higher earnings quality.  Thus, I provide a comparison of 
reporting large losses as my fourth earnings quality statistic (EQ4).  While some of 
related research has used the recognition of large negative losses and the skewnes  of 
earnings to examine timely loss recognition, I choose to focus on only one measure b sed 
                                                
19 Please note for ease of interpretation (and consistency with previous literature) higher values for bth 
versions of EQ3 indicate lower quality earnings, contrary to the other EQ variables where a higher value 
signifies greater earnings quality.   
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upon the Basu (1997) regression.20    The regression by Basu (1997) focuses more on the 
conservatism of financial reporting.  The reverse regression is as follows: 
EPSit =  + β1 RETit + β2 DUMit + β3 RETit * DUM it + εit, 
where EPS is annual earnings per share deflated by beginning of period price, RET is 15-
month return starting at the beginning of the year through three months after the end of 
the fiscal year, and DUM is an indicator variable equal to 1 if returns are negative (i.e., a 
proxy for bad news).  For EQ4, I use the coefficient on the interaction of the indicator 
and returns () to signify the recognition of timely losses, where a higher coefficient 
represents more conservatism and higher earnings quality. 
The last set of statistics relates to the value relevance of companies’ earnings with 
the premise that companies with higher-quality earnings should have a larger association 
between earnings and returns.  The first value relevance statistic (EQ5) is the R2 from the 
regression of price on book value and earnings (EPS) as follows: 
P6it =  + β1 BVPSit + β2 NIPSit + εit, 
where P6 is the price six months after the fiscal year-end, BVPS is book value of 
shareholders’ equity per share, and NIPS is net income per share.  All variables are scaled 
by price six months prior to fiscal year t in order to control for the scale factor’s influence 
on conclusions when comparing R2 between samples (Brown et al., 1999).21 
The second and third value relevance statistics are also R2 c mparisons utilizing 
separate Basu (1997) regressions for good news (EQ6) and bad news (EQ7) (i.e., positive 
                                                
20 I avoid the other measures of timely loss avoidance due to a potential sample bias -  smaller sub-sample 
sizes, greater variability in earnings for foreign cross-listers (see the discussion on descriptive statistics in 
section 5), and a focus solely on the first year of company performance – which may lead to inappropriate 
conclusions. 
21 Since I am examining the initial year of cross-lister , in some cases, the price six months prior to the 
beginning of the fiscal year is not available.  In those cases, I use the first price listed in Compustat Global. 
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and negative returns, respectively).  Companies that report losses in a timelier manner 
should have a better association between their earnings and returns.  Thus, higher-quality 
companies should have a higher R2.  This should especially hold true for the bad news 
cases, but I include the good news cases as a comparison as well.  Across all three value 




In this section, I present the results for comparisons of earnings quality around 
SOX and between types of listings as related to my proposed hypotheses.  For ach 
comparison, I provide a table with two panels to illustrate the results.  Panel A of ach 
table provides descriptive statistics across the two sub-samples, and Panel B compares 
the earnings quality statistics.  Each statistic measures an element of earnings quality with 
the expectation that the set of statistics as a whole would provide some indicatio  of 
higher quality for a set of companies.  In the tables, the statistics for the paricular sub-
sample that has higher earnings quality are in bold.22  While some statistics individually 
have significance statistics (as compared to zero) shown in the table, no known 
significance statistics exist to compare an earnings quality measur  from one sample to 
the same measure from another sample.  Previous studies utilizing this methodology (e.g. 
Lang et al 2003b and Lang et al. 2006) have made similar admissions; therefore, I 
attempt to solve this issue by utilizing bootstrapping re-samples which provide crit cal 
values to utilize given the actual differences I find in testing my hypotheses.  
Bootstrapping p-values are included in Panel B for each earnings quality statistic which 
                                                
22 Significance indicators related to the earnings quality statistics are provided in the tables. 
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indicates whether the differences between earnings quality statistics for the two sub-
samples are statistically significantly different.  The appendix at the end of the paper 
provides additional details on the specific bootstrapping procedures used to calculate the 
critical p-values.  All variable definitions and specific calculations of the earnings quality 
statistics are provided in Table 2. 
5.1. Did SOX Improve Earnings Quality in the U.S.? 
5.1.1. Main hypothesis – Pre-SOX ADRs vs. Post-SOX ADRs 
The first hypothesis posits that earnings quality has improved for ADRs around 
SOX.  Extant research suggests that earnings management has improved post-SOX, and 
the findings are attributed to the more stringent reporting requirements under SOX.  
Given the enhanced reporting environment, the premise of H1 is that if SOX influenced 
ADRs, then initial cross-listers post-SOX should have improved earnings quality as 
compared to the earnings quality of initial cross-listers prior to SOX.  Table 3 provides a 
comparison of earnings quality before and after SOX. 
The descriptive statistics in Panel A suggest that the sub-sample of post-SOX 
ADRs is significantly different from the pre-SOX ADRs.  Again, consistent with cross-
listing trends, ADRs in the pre-SOX period are much larger than in the post-SOX period.  
Post-SOX ADRs are more profitable in terms of OI and EPS and generate greater OCF, 
although ACCR are not significantly different.  On average, pre-SOX ADRs profitability 
is negative driven by more loss companies as indicated by the negative firs quartile.  
Consistent with profitability, post-SOX ADRs have higher and less variable returns.  
None of the control variables are significantly different between the two sub-samples. 
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The statistics in Panel B suggest that SOX had no overall influence on the 
earnings quality of ADRs.  Pre-SOX ADRs manage earnings less, as the variability of 
operating income is greater indicative of less smoothing (EQ1), the correlation of ACCR 
and OCF is less negative (EQ2), and both small loss avoidance statistics favor the pre-
SOX period (EQ3).  However, EQ4 shows that post-SOX ADRs are more conservative in 
terms of recognizing losses timelier, and two of the three value relevance st tistics also 
favor the post-period.  When returns are positive (good news), earnings are more value 
relevant pre-SOX, but when returns are negative (bad news), earnings are more value 
relevant post-SOX.  In total, four statistics (three of which are significa t at p=0.06 or 
less) suggest ADRs’ earnings quality is higher pre-SOX and three (only one of which is 
significant) suggest earnings quality is higher post-SOX.  Therefore, I find that SOX had 
no definitive influence on ADRs’ earnings quality, contrary to what was predicted n H1.  
The implication of this result is either that SOX is not successful in improving earnings 
quality of ADRs, or ADRs are not concerned with the enhanced financial reporting 
guidelines (i.e., not legally bonding to U.S. regulations).  I will return to the possibility of 
these implications as the remaining results are discussed. 
5.1.2. Additional considerations for ADRs’ earnings quality 
While the previous results suggest earnings quality did not improve for ADRs 
around SOX, I want to examine two additional considerations related to ADRs’ earnings 
quality.  The first is whether ADRs are generally associated with an increase in earnings 
quality after listing in the U.S.  Lang et al. (2003b) provide evidence that ADRs have 
greater earnings quality than those companies from their home countries that choose not 
to cross list.  This would imply either companies of greater earnings quality self-select to 
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cross list, or the act of cross listing in the U.S. leads these companies to want timprove 
their earnings quality given the increased expectation in earnings quality and investor 
protection.  The “bump” in earnings quality for ADRs might increase relativ ly more 
post-SOX given the increase in regulations on financial reporting.  To examine this issue, 
I do a within company comparison of earnings quality before and after cross listing both 
pre and post-SOX.  Table 4 provides the results.  Post-SOX I find that earnings quality is 
higher prior to cross listing for five of the seven measures (three of which are significant 
at p=0.10).  The opposite is true pre-SOX as five of the seven measures (four which are 
significant) favor higher earnings quality after cross listing.  Thus, the within company 
improvement in earnings quality is not greater post-SOX; however, the lack of influence 
from SOX is consistent with the findings evidence from testing H1. 
Another possibility is a “learning” effect for foreign companies as theyacclimate 
themselves to the new reporting regulations in the U.S., especially post-SOX.  The 
implication is that earnings quality should improve as ADRs are more familiar w th 
reporting requirements.  In Table 5, I compare the earnings quality of ADRs in year three 
of cross listing versus the initial year of cross listing (as tested in H1) both pre-SOX and 
post-SOX.  The results in the pre-SOX period show no significant difference in earni gs 
quality between the two years, as four measures favor year 3 and three measures f vor 
year 1 – only two measures are significantly different and both favor year one.  Turning 
to post-SOX ADRs, I find results that more strongly suggest earnings quality is h gher in 
the initial year of cross listing – five directionally favor year 1, two of which are 
significantly different from year 3.  These results show that companies do not improve 
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their earnings quality as they become more familiar with U.S. regulations and SOX in 
particular.   
The fact that ADRs’ earnings quality does not improve after listing in the U.S. 
post- SOX and that ADRs do not “learn” from SOX provide consistent support with 
evidence from testing H1 – SOX has had limited impact on the earnings quality of ADRs.  
These findings suggest that foreign companies are not primarily concerned with the 
enhanced regulations and enforcement supposedly associated with SOX.  The legal 
bonding by cross-listers to a new reporting environment would imply that foreign 
companies are subject to the laws and regulations of that country; however, the lack of 
improved (and even decline in) earnings quality implies such legal bonding is not taking 
place for ADRs around SOX.  Foreign companies continue to bond to the U.S. markets 
but only in a reputational sense, consistent with suggestions by Siegel (2005).  The 
following result for domestic U.S. companies provides additional support for these 
conjectures. 
5.2. Is the Change in Earnings Quality Different for U.S. Companies than for ADRs? 
My second hypothesis compares the change in earnings quality around SOX for 
ADRs with that of U.S. companies to determine the differential impact SOX had on these 
companies.  Based upon the lack of improved earnings quality for ADRs around SOX, a 
logical comparison is to examine whether earnings quality has improved for domestic 
U.S. companies.  Previous research suggests that U.S. companies in total have improved 
in earnings quality (at least as it relates to earnings management); however, my previous 
results related to ADRs contradict research on the U.S. market in total.  Cohen et al. 
(2008) and Lobo and Zhou (2006) find that earnings management has declined for U.S. 
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companies post-SOX, but I find that earnings management is actually higher for ADRs 
post-SOX.  As suggested with the results from H1 (including the additional analyses), 
ADRs appear to be unaffected by SOX’s provisions, U.S. companies’ earnings quality
may improve more around SOX than ADRs. 
Table 6 provides results to directly compare ADRs and U.S. companies.  The 
descriptive statistics in Panel A include only those related to U.S. companies, as I 
previously reported descriptive statistics for ADRs in Table 3.  Whereas significant 
differences existed for ADRs pre and post-SOX, such is not the case for U.S. companies.  
Across all main and control variables, none are significantly different pre to post.  N te 
that on average U.S. companies generate positive OCF and incur negative ACCR and 
negative EPS.  In untabulated comparisons between ADRs and U.S. companies, U.S. 
companies pre-SOX have higher OI (but lower EPS) and OCF and have greater returns,
while in the post-SOX period ADRs are more profitable (OI and EPS), generate higher
OCF, and have greater returns. 
 Focusing on the earnings quality statistics in Panel B, I display U.S. results pre 
and post only, but I also show the changes around SOX (post less pre) in the farthest right 
two columns.  By comparing the changes between ADRs and U.S. companies I utilizea 
difference-in-differences approach which better controls for economic variations between 
the two sub-samples of companies.  For U.S. companies, I find that earnings quality has 
improved for five of the seven statistics compared with three for ADRs.  Both samples 
improve in timely loss recognition (EQ4) and value relevance in bad news situations 
(EQ7), but only U.S. companies are improving in earnings management – consistent with 
findings of less earnings management post-SOX documented by Cohen et al. (2008).  
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When examining the difference-in-differences, in only one case is the change in earnings 
quality greater for ADRs – value relevance of accounting data to price (EQ5).  Consistent 
with H2, SOX did have a differential impact on ADRs versus U.S. companies. 
While the effect on U.S. companies is consistent with related literature, my focus 
is more on the implications of SOX on cross-listers.  The fact that SOX had a differential 
impact on U.S. companies and ADRs despite the fact that both are subject to most of the 
same reporting requirements, suggests that foreign companies choosing to crosslist on 
U.S. exchanges were not necessarily influenced by the increased stringency in fi ancial 
reporting under SOX.  These results provide further evidence that the bonding hypothesis 
may hold in terms of reputation by providing a sense of improved investor protection, but 
legally, foreign companies cross listing in the U.S. appear to have little fear of litigation 
risk for noncompliance.  Given the supposed increase in enforcement accompanying 
SOX, a reasonable expectation would be that ADRs that generally originate from 
environments with weaker corporate governance would have shown some evidence of 
improved earnings quality if compliance was a significant concern, but my results are 
contrary to this conjecture. 
5.3. Did Earnings Quality Improve More for ADRs than Other Foreign Companies? 
5.3.1 ADRs vs. GDRs (Post-SOX) 
My next hypothesis compares the earnings quality of ADRs versus GDRs in the 
post-SOX period.  While I discovered no positive temporal impact from SOX on ADRs, a 
comparison of earnings quality with foreign companies choosing to cross list on non-U.S. 
exchanges may provide some insights into the types of companies cross listing on these 
exchanges.  I anticipate that SOX will have a differential impact on the two sets f 
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companies given the enhanced financial reporting standards and supposed increased 
enforcement of rules under SOX.  As a result, the barriers to cross list on U.S. exchanges 
increased, and I hypothesize that only those companies of higher reporting quality will 
list in the U.S.  Further, U.S. markets are generally associated with higher quality 
earnings (Dye and Sunder, 2001; Bradshaw et al., 2004, and Bradshaw and Miller, 2008); 
therefore, I expect the earnings quality of ADRs to exceed that of GDRs, especially in the 
post-SOX period.  Table 7, Panels A and B provide the results for this comparison. 
On average, the ADRs are more profitable than the GDRs, when comparing both 
OI and EPS.  The mean EPS for GDRs is actually negative and both profitability 
measures are more volatile (higher standard deviations) than the ADR sample.  The 
negative EPS and smaller positive OCF results in a larger negative ACCR measure 
compared to ADRs.  Despite less profitability, GDRs have significantly higher returns 
over the initial year of cross listing, but returns also have greater variability.  In terms of 
control variables used in the calculation of some of the earnings quality statistics, ADRs 
are significantly larger and have significantly greater sales growth, consistent with the 
profitability measures. 
The descriptive statistics correspond with many of the earnings quality st tistics 
in Panel B.  Beginning with the earnings management statistics, results are mixed across 
the three measures.  EQ1 significantly favors GDRs implying they smooth earnings less 
than ADRs; however, the correlation of accruals and operating cash flows (EQ2) is 
significantly less negative for ADRs.  Then for small loss avoidance, the negative 
coefficient on the ADR indicator variable suggests that ADRs are less likely to manage 
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earnings to achieve a small profit but, GDRs have a significantly smaller r tio of small 
profits to small losses.   
While the earnings management statistics provide no conclusive evidence, the 
remaining four statistics (two significantly) indicate ADRs have higher quality earnings.  
I find that ADRs recognize losses in a timelier manner and have more value relevant 
accounting information.  Panel A indicates that GDRs were significantly less profitable 
but had significantly higher returns.  These conflicting findings are evident in the fact that 
the R2 for GDRs are lower than ADRs across all three value relevance statistics.  In total, 
ADRs possess higher quality earnings for five earnings quality statistics, GDRs one, and 
conflicting evidence for loss avoidance.  Overall, the results suggest that ADRs in the 
post-SOX period have significantly higher earnings quality than GDRs, consistent wi h 
H3.  These findings are also consistent with Lang et al.’s (2003) examination of ADR 
earnings quality in the pre-SOX period as it compares to other foreign companies.  
Further, my evidence is consistent with the suggestion that U.S.-listed companies are of 
higher quality.  While the above results do not directly assess the influence of SOX on 
cross-listers (as these results combined with the supporting hypotheses allow more direct 
conclusions), it appears that cross-listers coming to the U.S. in the post-SOX period 
possess greater earnings quality than cross-listers on non-U.S. exchanges, suggesting 
only those foreign companies of higher earnings quality are willing to take on the 
additional costs imposed by SOX to list on U.S. exchanges. 
5.3.2. Additional research questions addressing the earnings quality for GDRs 
 The research questions address the indirect influence SOX may have on GDRs.  
The expectation, corroborated by the shift in listing trends during my sample period, is 
41 
 
that many foreign companies that might have cross listed in the U.S. chose not to due to 
the stringent reporting requirements expected under SOX.  As explained previously, the 
shift of foreign companies to non-U.S. exchanges could either improve or worsen the 
earnings quality of GDRs on average.  Following a similar comparison to H1, my first 
research question compares the post-SOX earnings quality of initial GDRs to that of pre-
SOX initial GDRs.  Panel A of Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics for these two sub-
samples.  Pre-SOX GDRs are significantly more profitable (OI and EPS) and generate 
significantly greater OCF, but ACCR is also significantly more negative.  While not 
significant at conventional levels, returns are higher in the post-SOX period.  F nally, the 
only control variable that is significantly different between the two sub-samples is capital 
intensity greater in the pre-SOX period. 
 Panel B of Table 8 shows the results across the seven earnings quality statistics.  
Like the comparison across SOX for ADRs, I find no definitive results related to the 
influence of SOX on GDRs.  Pre-SOX GDRs have significantly higher earnings quality 
for three of the statistics – less earnings smoothing (EQ1) and two value relevance 
statistics (EQ5 and EQ6).  Conflicting evidence exists for the two measures of small loss 
avoidance, and post-SOX GDRs have significantly higher earnings quality across the 
remaining three statistics.  Based upon these results, I conclude that SOX had no
definitive influence on earnings quality for GDRs.  Further, the lack of change in 
earnings quality for GDRs would also refute any suggestion that some “international” 
SOX legislation that has been enacted in various countries has influenced earnings 
quality (at least as it pertains to my sample). 
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 The second research question addresses the differential impact SOX had on GDRs 
and a matched sample of foreign companies that have not cross listed (NCLs).  The 
maintained assumption here is that companies choosing to cross list more likely have 
improved earnings quality as compared to those that do not.  Further, if SOX has any 
influence on foreign companies, its influence is more likely to be associated to those 
deciding to cross list.  Table 9 provides the results for RQ2.  Panel A shows only the 
descriptive statistics for NCLs, as those for GDRs were reported in Table 7.  The only 
significant differences of note for NCLs pre to post are that ACCR are smaller in the 
post-SOX period but returns are higher.  Panel B first compares NCLs post and pre-SOX 
and then the changes around SOX (post – pre) for GDRs and NCLs.  Both sub-samples 
improved in four earnings quality statistics, but in comparing the difference-in-
differences, changes in GDRs were greater than changes in NCLs acros five of the seven 
earnings quality statistics.  Overall these results pertaining to foreign companies 
addressed in RQ1 and RQ2 suggest that SOX had limited influence on the earnings 
quality of these companies.  While the differential impact on GDRs exceeded that of 
NCLs, I find no overall improvement in earnings quality for GDRs – four statistics 
improved while three declined from pre to post-SOX. 
  
6. Sensitivity Analyses 
In this section, I examine some issues that may provide additional insight into my 
main set of results.  The first set of sensitivity analyses examines the influence investor 
protection may have on the earnings quality of cross-listers around SOX.  The second t 
of analyses focuses on the influence of the London AIM market on the earnings quality 
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of my GDR sample.  The largest portion of my post-SOX GDR sub-sample is from the 
AIM market which to some degree was specifically targeted towards potential cross-
listers that were hesitant to list on U.S. exchanges after the enactment of SOX. 
6.1. Investor Protection and Earnings Quality around SOX 
My second hypothesis posits that earnings quality will increase more around SOX 
for ADRs than U.S. companies because ADRs originate from a financial reporting 
environment that, as research has shown, has lower corporate governance standards (or 
weaker investor protection).  Given the increased financial reporting scrutiny and 
perceived enhancement in reporting quality associated with SOX, I would expect to s e 
an incrementally greater improvement for ADRs than U.S. companies given the reporting 
environment from which ADRs originate.  Contrary to my expectations, my results 
indicate that U.S. companies improved earnings quality around SOX more than ADRs.  
Despite this finding, I cannot explicitly conclude that the investor protection environment 
from which foreign companies originate has no influence on earnings quality around 
SOX within the sample of ADRs.  Therefore, I examine the change in earnings quality
around SOX for ADRs originating from weaker investor protection countries compared 
to those from stronger investor protection countries. 
Research has shown the differential impact investor protection has on the cross-
listing decision.  ADRs generally find a significant reduction in cost of capital after their 
listing, and the effect is larger for companies from countries with weaker corporate 
governance (Hail and Leuz, 2009).  Incorporating the influence of SOX, Berger et al. 
(2006) find the stock market reaction to SOX is larger for cross-listers from countries 
with weak private enforcement of investor rights.  What follows is an expectation of a 
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greater incremental impact on the earnings quality of ADRs originating from countries 
with weaker corporate governance compared to ADRs from countries with stronger 
corporate governance.  Table 10 shows that contrary to this expectation, the differential 
impact from SOX on ADRs is actually greater for companies originating from high 
investor protection companies.  For low investor protection companies, earnings quality 
declined for all statistics except for the value relevance of accounting i formation with 
price (EQ5).  The decline in earnings quality is not as prevalent for high investor 
protection companies, as three of the seven statistics actually improved for pre t  post.  
Relying upon the difference-in-differences approach in comparing changes for these two 
sub-samples, the differential impact is greater for high investor protection companies in 
five of the seven statistics.   
Hope et al. (2007) find that companies from weaker disclosure environments are 
more likely to cross list in the U.S. but are less likely to list on exchanges where
compliance with U.S. GAAP is required.  This finding is consistent with recent cross-
listing trends where more U.S. cross-listers are using private placements to gain exposure 
to U.S. markets.  Thus, the possibility exists that many companies of high-quality 
earnings are choosing to avoid the improved U.S. disclosure environment in the post-
SOX period.  Such a possibility contributes to the fact that I find no indication that 
companies from countries with weaker investor protection environments have improved 
earnings quality. 
6.2. The Earnings Quality of GDRs from the AIM Market 
The two research questions attempt to address the influence SOX had on the 
earnings quality of GDRs across several non-U.S. exchanges.  Admittedly, the influence 
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of legislation on financial reporting in the U.S. may have only an indirect influence o  
cross-listers outside the U.S.  As my results indicate, I find no change in earn gs quality 
for GDRs around SOX.  One confounding issue that could drive my results is the 
predominant role that the London AIM market plays in my sample of GDRs compared 
with other non-U.S. exchanges.   
Non-U.S. exchanges, and in particular London’s AIM market, have taken 
advantage of the more stringent reporting requirements under SOX by attempting to 
attract foreign companies to their market by promoting cheaper listings, as well as lower 
regulatory and disclosure requirements.  The AIM market is a newer exchange desi ned 
to appeal to mostly smaller, less-profitable companies from developing coutries.  
Through the end of the fiscal year-end for the London Stock Exchange (March 31, 2007), 
of the 323 new listing, 243 were on the AIM exchange as compared to the LSE Main 
exchange.  Figure 2B corroborates this evidence through the end of 2006.  The issue with 
the AIM is that its benefits – lower dollar listing costs and less stringent regulation – also 
lend itself to attracting companies with lower quality earnings (Nordberg, 2008).  Given 
69 of my 156 post-SOX GDRs are from the AIM exchange, the lax reporting 
requirements from this exchange may be driving my results; however, littl evidence also 
exists concerning the earnings quality of cross-listers on these other exchanges as well.  
To examine the influence specifically of the AIM exchange, I conduct additional analyses 
on the earnings quality of post-SOX GDRs, comparing AIM exchange cross-lister  wi h 
non-AIM exchange cross-listers. 
From the results provided in Table 11, I first find no consistent evidence of 
improved earnings quality around SOX for non-AIM GDRs – consistent with results 
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discussed for RQ1 inclusive of all GDRs (comparing the first two columns of EQ data).  
Further, when I compare AIM-listed GDRs in the post period to non-AIM GDRs, I find
no evidence suggesting AIM-listed companies possess lower earnings quality.  This 
suggests that while the AIM market has more lax reporting standards than in the U.S., 
this smaller London market still attracts cross-listers of at leastcomparable earnings 
quality to those on other non-U.S. exchanges.  Overall, I conclude that AIM-listed GDRs 
did not influence my results when comparing the full sample of GDRs to ADRs in my 




In this paper, I examine the impact of SOX on the earnings quality of cross-listers 
both in the U.S. and globally.  The intent of SOX was to improve the overall quality of 
financial reporting in the U.S.  However, an important concern is the possibility that 
increased regulation came with significant costs but little improvement in fina cial 
reporting quality.  One result of these costs is the possible limitation in investment 
choices for U.S. investors, as trends subsequent to SOX suggest many foreign compaies 
chose to cross list on non-U.S. exchanges.  However, to the extent that SOX resulted in 
companies with lower quality earnings choosing to cross list elsewhere, the additional 
costs may have been worthwhile.  To examine the influence of SOX on earnings quality,
I use a sample of 680 cross-listers from 1998-2006 to provide a series of comparisons of 
earnings quality statistics that cover earnings management, timely recognition of losses, 
and the value relevance of accounting information of cross-listers. 
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I begin my examination of cross-listers’ earnings quality with a focus on the 
direct link between SOX and ADRs who are required to comply with the new legislation.  
My first test examines the change in earnings quality around SOX, and I find that 
earnings quality did not improve for ADRs.  Additional tests indicate that ADRs also do 
not achieve a “bump” in earnings quality pre-listing to post-listing even after SOX, nor 
do ADRs’ earnings quality improve as they familiarize themselves with or “learn” about 
SOX’s regulations.  Combined, my findings suggest ADRs are unaffected by SOX 
despite being within the scope of the legislation, and this fact is even more surprising 
given that I find the earnings quality of a matched sample of domestic U.S. companies 
has improved around SOX.   
Given my research question is focused on the outcome of earnings quality based 
upon the cross-listing decision, my next set of tests examines the earnings quality of 
GDRs in relation to ADRs.  In this set of tests, I first compare ADRs to GDRs in the 
post-SOX period and find that those foreign companies cross listing on U.S. exchanges 
have higher earnings quality, consistent with previous research (Lang et al. 2003; Leuz et 
al. 2003) that has found U.S. listings are typically associated with higher quality earnings.  
Similar to ADRs, I also find that SOX did not have a positive impact on earnings quality 
for GDRs.  An additional research question focusing on GDRs suggests that those foreign 
companies choosing to cross list did have a greater improvement in earnings quality 
around SOX than those choosing to not cross list.  Therefore, across the sub-sample of 
companies whose earnings quality I examine, SOX had a significant incremental impact 
on U.S. domestic companies but no impact on ADRs, GDRs, or those non-cross-listers.  
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As described above, some of these results would be anticipated and others are contrary to 
the expected outcome from SOX.   
A recent paper by Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) also examining the influence of 
SOX on listing cross-listing preferences finds that the adverse effects of SOX (increased 
reporting, regulatory and litigation costs) influenced only the decision of smaller ( s 
opposed to larger) foreign companies desiring a cross listing.  Such a finding is consistent 
with the inability of smaller companies to absorb the incremental costs association with 
SOX.  While the authors claim these results will enhance the bonding-related benefits of 
a U.S. listing (as smaller companies with weaker corporate governance are d terred from 
cross listing in the U.S.), I find evidence consistent with criticisms of the bonding 
hypothesis.  The bonding hypothesis suggests that foreign companies cross list in the U.S. 
to provide a signal to investors that they desire to compensate for the lack of investor 
protection in their home country.  Given the supposed increase in enforcement 
accompanying SOX, a reasonable expectation would be that ADRs that generally 
originate from environments with weaker corporate governance would have shown some 
evidence of improved earnings quality if compliance was a significant concern.  
However, as stated previously, the findings relating ADRs to SOX provides additional 
support to the findings by Siegel (2005) which suggests that cross-listers to the U.S. 
reputationally bond with U.S. markets but do not legally bond – they are unconcerned 
with the enforcement from non-compliance due to the inability of regulatory agencies 
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APPENDIX A - Bootstrapping Procedures for Comparing Earnings Quality 
Statistics 
 
 One of the challenges to utilizing a methodology of comparing various earnings 
quality statistics between two samples is the lack of significance statistics to determine 
whether one sample has significantly greater earnings quality for a particular statistic than 
the other sample.  Lang et al. (2003b) and Lang et al. (2006) use this methodology and 
make admissions that no comparative statistics exist for some of their earnings quality 
measures, thus comparisons in earnings quality are directional (higher or lower) in nature.  
In an attempt to provide some significance to my comparisons of earnings quality, I use 
bootstrapping procedures to create confidence limits on the differences in each earnings 
quality statistic across sub-samples.  I run the following bootstrapping procedures for 
each comparison of earnings quality between sub-samples across each of the seven 
earnings quality statistics: 
1. Merge the two sub-samples of interest into one “combined” sample. 
2. Draw 1,000 re-samples with replacement from the combined sample, where the 
number of observations for each re-sample is equal to the size of the combined 
sample. 
3. For each observation in the re-samples, randomly assign the observation to one of 
the two separate groups of interest. 
4. Calculate each of the earnings quality statistics separately for the two randomly 
assigned groups 
5. For each earnings quality statistic, calculate the difference in statstics between 
the two groups. 
6. [Difference in changes analyses only]  For each change in earnings quality 
statistics across temporal sub-groups (pre to post) within a particular group (i.e., 
ADRs or U.S. companies), calculate the difference in the differences across the 
two comparison groups (i.e., ADRs vs. U.S. companies).  
7. From the resulting 1,000 difference (or difference in changes) calculations for 
each earnings quality statistic, determine the critical p-value for the actual 
difference between the test statistics shown in the tables. 
 
To illustrate the above procedures, the following provides a walkthrough for 
calculating the bootstrapped p-values that appear in Table 3, Panel B.  The first 
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hypothesis compares the earnings quality of post-SOX ADRs to pre-SOX ADRs, so to 
begin the bootstrapping process I combined the two samples, creating a new combined 
sample of 393 observations (262 pre-SOX and 131 post-SOX).  Then to develop each re-
sample I draw one observation from the combined sample and repeat this process, with 
replacement (which implies a particular observation could be drawn multiple times), to 
develop a full re-sample of 393 observations.  Each of the observations in the re-sample 
is then randomly assigned either to the pre-SOX or post-SOX group, and I then use these 
separate groups to calculate the seven earnings quality statistics.  Finally, I calculate the 
difference between EQ1 from the randomly assigned pre-SOX group to EQ1 from the 
randomly assigned post-SOX group and repeat that process for EQ2 through EQ7.  In 
total, I draw 1,000 re-samples and repeat these processes, resulting in a distribution of 
1,000 difference calculations between the two randomly assigned groups for each f the 
seven statistics.  Sorting the difference calculations from lowest to highest, I can then 
compare the actual statistics from Table 3, Panel B to determine the appropriate p-value.  
The actual difference for EQ1 is -0.177 (0.961 – 1.138) which based upon my 
bootstrapped differences results in a critical value of 0.03.  The reason for this procedure 
is the difficulty in determining whether -0.177 is significantly greater than a random 
difference.  The bootstrapping procedures generate a random distribution of differences 
for each earnings quality statistic which I can use to determine the significance of the 
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Prior to the initial selling of ADRs in the U.S.: 
1) The Local Company establishes an exclusive legal arrangement between itself, 
the Depository Bank and the Custodian Bank. 
2) The Local Company issues stock to the Custodian Bank and the stock serves as 
underlying shares for ADRs that are provided to the Depository Bank. 
 
Steps for U.S. Investor to obtain new ADRs: 
3) U.S. Investors request the purchase of ADRs through the Broker. 
4) The Broker requests ADRs from the Depository Bank who has exclusive 
agreement with Local Company and also maintains ADRs. 
5) The Depository Bank issues new ADRs to the Broker via the Depository Trust 
Corporation (not shown) which handles all the trading of depository receipts in 
the U.S. 
6) The buying and selling of existing ADRs continues on U.S. exchanges after the 
initial ADRs are requested and issued. 
 
Note:  The above figure is a modification of Figure 3b – Volume Mechanics of a 
Sponsored ADR Program from Desai (2004), page 16. 



















Figure 2A – Total Initial Cross-listers on U.S. and Non-U.S. Exchanges 
 
Figure 2B – Initial Cross-listers on Non-U.S. Exchanges 
 
Note:  To show the complete listing trends, the above figures include all applicable 
listings; however, my sample, as shown in Table 1, includes a subset of these 
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Table 1 – Sample Selection 
 








 (Level II, III)
GDR 
Total LSE Main LSE AIM Euronext Frankfurt Tokyo Toronto Luxembourg Zurich
1998 31 23 17 0 NA 3 1 1 1 0
1999 80 49 12 2 2 22 0 0 10 1
2000 95 37 15 3 2 12 0 0 4 1
2001 42 16 8 4 2 0 0 0 2 0
Apr-02 14 6 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0
Sep-02 19 9 3 1 2 0 0 0 3 0
2003 18 27 6 5 3 0 0 0 13 0
2004 28 31 2 21 3 0 0 1 4 0
2005 34 51 5 27 0 0 1 6 12 0
2006 32 38 9 15 1 1 0 4 8 0
Total 393 287 79 80 16 38 2 12 58 2
Pre (98 - 04/2002) 262 131 54 11 7 37 1 1 18 2
Post (09/2002 - 2006) 131 156 25 69 9 1 1 11 40 0
Sample prior to removing companies with missing financial variables
Total 402 894 211 337 56 77 12 52 137 12
Pre (98 - 04/2002) 267 287 137 17 16 67 7 5 29 9













Panel B – Initial Cross-listings by Home Country 
 
PRE POST PRE POST
Argentina 4               2               
Australia 4               40             8               9               
Austria 10             1               
Belgium 1               2               
Bangladesh 1               
Belize 1               
Bermuda 1               2               6               
Brazil 2               1               
Canada 2               11             
Switzerland 7               1               9               1               
Chile 3               3               
China 2               1               4               4               
Caymans 4               26             
Czech Republic 2               
Germany 3               1               18             6               
Denmark 2               
Dominican Rep. 1               
Egypt 1               
Spain 1               1               5               
Finland 4               1               
France 7               19             2               
Great Britain 4               16             54             19             
Gibraltar 2               
Greece 5               1               4               1               
Hong Kong 6               3               
Hungary 2               
Indonesia 1               
India 6               19             11             2               
Ireland 13             15             7               3               
Israel 5               5               2               
Italy 2               1               2               5               
Japan 3               13             3               
Korea 5               8               5               9               
Luxembourg 6               1               4               4               
Martinique 1               
Mexico 7               6               
Netherlands 10             18             5               
Norway 1               3               1               
New Zealand 1               3               1               
Pakistan 1               
Philippines 1               1               1               
Papua New Guinea 1               
Poland 6               1               
Russia 2               3               2               
Singapore 2               
Sweden 2               8               2               
Turkey 1               1               
Taiwan 12             18             3               2               
USA 6               6               
Venezuela 2               
Virgin Islands 4               
South Africa 1               3               3               4               
131           156           262           131           
     GDR      ADR
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Panel C – Initial Cross-listings by Industry 
 
  
PRE POST PRE POST
Construction 1 2 3 0
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 1 4 24 12
Manufacturing 53 53 101 53
Mining 8 48 9 9
Services 36 24 49 22
Transportation, Communcations, Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services 25 15 67 31
Wholesale/Retail Trade 6 7 7 4
Other 1 3 2 0
131 156 262 131










EQ1 Variability of OI and OCF
standard deviation of operating income scaled by the s andard deviation of operating cash flows, both deflated by total 
assets
EQ2 Correlation of ACCR and OCF
Spearman correlation coefficient between the residuals of accruals and the residuals of cash flows after regressing each on 
the control variables2
coefficient on indicator variable (SUB) for sample of interest from a regression of a dummy variable = 1 for small positive 
earnings on control variables and SUB = 1 for the sample of interest2
ratio of small profits to small losses
Timely Loss Recognition Statistic
EQ4 Conservatism coefficient on RET*DUM for Basu (1997) regression, where DUM=1 for negative returns4
Value Relevance Statistics
EQ5 Price and accounting data
R2 from regression of price six months after the end of the fiscal year on an intercept, book value per share, and earnings 
per share5
EQ6 Good News R2 from Basu regression for positive returns4






5 The price regression is as follows:  P6 = a  + B 1  BVPS + B 2  NIPS + ε, where P6 is the price six months after the end of the fiscal year, BVPS is book value per share, and 
NIPS is net income per share.  All variables are deflated by price 6 months prior to the fiscal year.
All statistics are oriented where a higher number signifies greater earnings quality.  The one exception is EQ3 for small loss avoidance.  By design, a negative coefficient on 
the Post variable signifies a smaller likelihood that companies are avoiding losses in the post-period, hence a signal of greater earnings quality.
The Basu (1997) regression is as follows:  EPS = a  + B 1  RET + B 2  DUM + B 3  RET*DUM + ε, where EPS is earnings per share deflated by priceat the beginning of the 
period, RET is the 15-month return from the beginning of year t through the first three months of year t+1, and DUM=1 if returns are negative and 0 otherwise.
Control variables include those variables identified by Pagano et al. (2002) that influences the cross-listing decisions.  Specifically, I control for size (SIZE) = natural log of 
assets, equity issuances (EQISS) = the % change in common stock, debt issuances (DEBTISS) = the % change in liabilities, leverage (LVG) = liabilities divided by 
stockholders' equity, capital intensity (AST_TURN) = sales divided by assets, cash flows to assets (PI) = OCF divided by assets, and sales growth (SGROW) = the % change 
in sales.
EQ3 Small loss avoidance3
For both small loss avoidance measures, I classify any company-year's net income deflated by lagged total assets in the following range [-0.025, 0) as a sm ll profit and in the 
following range [0, 0.025] as a small profit.
Variable definitions:  OI = operating income after depreciation, OCF = operating cash flows, ACCR = accruals calculated as (∆current assets – ∆cash) – (∆current liabilities – 
∆short-term debt in current liabilities – ∆taxes payable) - depreciation.  Variables are deflated by beginning of period total assets.  All variables used to calculate earnings 





Table 3 – Comparison of Earnings Quality for ADRs before and after SOX (H1) 
 





Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 t-stat
OI 0.124 0.096 0.210 0.029 0.198 -0.133 0.038 0.509 -0.078 0.117 7.08 *
OCF 0.078 0.098 0.116 0.051 0.143 0.025 0.052 0.132 -0.035 0.107 4.10 *
ACCR -0.050 -0.049 0.075 -0.099 -0.003 -0.056 -0.045 0.078 -0.095 -0.004 0.71
EPS 0.041 0.044 0.094 0.013 0.095 -0.003 0.014 0.099 -0.036 0.048 4.40 *
RET 0.219 0.145 0.472 -0.110 0.415 0.037 -0.126 0.782 -0.4580.205 2.87 *
Control Variables
SIZE 7.478 7.747 2.388 5.258 9.202 7.211 6.998 2.285 5.349 9.092 1.05
EQISS 0.202 0.086 0.386 0.000 0.300 0.236 0.034 0.405 0.000 0.428 -0.83
DEBTISS 0.212 0.121 0.423 -0.056 0.475 0.263 0.131 0.475 -0.051 0.608 -1.13
LVG 0.457 0.449 0.254 0.243 0.666 0.504 0.534 0.259 0.248 0.693 -1.73
AST_TURN 0.589 0.540 0.362 0.311 0.842 0.544 0.462 0.412 0.193 0.792 1.12
SGROW 0.325 0.200 0.373 0.062 0.572 0.335 0.218 0.432 0.028 0.652 -0.24









*, ** t-test of differences in means significantly different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed); #, ## significantly different from zero at 
0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed). For procedures to calculate bootstrapped p-values, see the Appendix. Bolded statistics indicate higher earnings 
quality. Variable definitions and calculation of earnings quality statistics are available in Table 2.
  




EQ1 Variability of Operating Income to Operating Cash Flows 0.961 1.138 0.03
EQ2 Correlation of Operating Accruals to Operating Cash Flows -0.351# -0.243# 0.25
Small Loss Avoidance (coefficient on Post ADR indicator)
Small Loss Avoidance (ratio of small profits to small losses) 5.750 2.625 0.06
Timely Loss Recognition Statistic
EQ4 Conservatism (Basu regression R*DUM coefficient) 0.255## 0.206## 0.20
Value Relevance Statistics (R2 )
EQ5 Price to Accounting Data 0.264 0.147 0.08
EQ6 Good News (Basu regression) 0.080 0.146 0.04
EQ7 Bad News (Basu regression) 0.226 0.216 0.20
EQ3









*, ** t-test of differences in means significantly different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed); #, ## significantly different from zero at 
0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed). For procedures to calculate bootstrapped p-values, see the Appendix. Bolded statistics indicate higher earnings 
quality. Variable definitions and calculation of earnings quality statistics are available in Table 2. 
 
  
Earnings Quality Statistic ADRs Pre CL
Bootstrap




EQ1 Variability of Operating Income to Operating Cash Flows 0.961 1.099 0.02 1.138 1.027 0.01
EQ2 Correlation of Operating Accruals to Operating Cash Flows -0.351# 0.396 0.00 -0.243# -0.150## 0.12
Small Loss Avoidance (ratio of small profits to small losses) 5.750 5.667 0.43 2.625 1.571 0.18
Timely Loss Recognition Statistic
EQ4 Conservatism (Basu regression R*DUM coefficient) 0.255## 0.381# 0.17 0.206# -0.066 0.00
Value Relevance Statistics (R2 )
EQ5 Price to Accounting Data 0.264 0.038 0.00 0.147 0.119 0.27
EQ6 Good News (Basu regression) 0.080 0.175 0.10 0.146 0.000 0.00











*, ** t-test of differences in means significantly different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed); #, ## significantly different from zero at 
0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed). For procedures to calculate bootstrapped p-values, see the Appendix. Bolded statistics indicate higher earnings 
quality. Variable definitions and calculation of earnings quality statistics are available in Table 2.  
Comparison of Earnings Quality for ADRs before and fter SOX - YEAR 3
Earnings Quality Statistic Year 3 Year 1
Bootstrap




EQ1 Variability of Operating Income to Operating Cash Flows 0.868 0.961 0.17 1.193 1.138 0.28
EQ2 Correlation of Operating Accruals to Operating Cash Flows -0.350## -0.351# 0.42 -0.211# -0.243# 0.42
Small Loss Avoidance (ratio of small profits to small losses) 2.333 5.750 0.22 4.300 2.625 0.20
Timely Loss Recognition Statistic
EQ4 Conservatism (Basu regression R*DUM coefficient) 0.016 0.255## 0.02 0.325# 0.206# 0.11
Value Relevance Statistics (R2 )
EQ5 Price to Accounting Data 0.142 0.264 0.22 0.161 0.147 0.39
EQ6 Good News (Basu regression) 0.001 0.080 0.15 0.033 0.146 0.07
EQ7 Bad News (Basu regression) 0.003 0.226 0.00 0.046 0.216 0.00
EQ3





Table 6 – Comparison of the Change in Earnings Quality around SOX (Post - Pre) for ADRs and US Companies (H2) 
 





Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 t-stat
OI 0.017 0.059 0.192 -0.001 0.106 0.029 0.045 0.176 -0.048 0.131 -0.58
OCF 0.043 0.067 0.128 0.010 0.123 0.043 0.062 0.114 -0.023 0.122 -0.02
ACCR -0.072 -0.055 0.099 -0.095 -0.019 -0.076 -0.062 0.094 -0.095 -0.017 0.38
EPS -0.032 0.039 0.182 -0.083 0.078 -0.033 0.012 0.159 -0.047 0.058 0.07
RET 0.177 0.121 0.514 -0.103 0.398 0.081 -0.104 0.806 -0.4230.273 1.43
Control Variables
SIZE 7.248 7.581 2.158 5.253 8.782 6.876 6.869 1.995 5.315 8.323 1.61
EQISS 0.103 0.010 0.252 0.000 0.091 0.138 0.019 0.437 0.000 0.219 -1.01
DEBTISS 0.128 0.027 0.356 -0.074 0.215 0.210 0.098 0.503 -0.050 0.500 -1.86
LVG 0.557 0.581 0.251 0.348 0.744 0.570 0.572 0.260 0.375 0.785 -0.48
AST_TURN 0.714 0.588 0.525 0.314 0.921 0.714 0.630 0.482 0.321 1.029 0.00
SGROW 0.155 0.110 0.349 -0.041 0.247 0.212 0.138 0.492 -0.045 0.490 -1.32









*, ** t-test of differences in means significantly different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed); #, ## significantly different from zero at 
0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed). For procedures to calculate bootstrapped p-values, see the Appendix. Bolded statistics indicate higher earnings 
quality. Variable definitions and calculation of earnings quality statistics are available in Table 2. 
  
Comparison of the Change in Earnings Quality around SOX (Post - Pre) for ADRs and US Companies




EQ1 Variability of Operating Income to Operating Cash Flows 1.147 1.139 -0.177 0.008 0.01
EQ2 Correlation of Operating Accruals to Operating Cash Flows -0.134 -0.221# -0.107 0.087 0.11
Small Loss Avoidance (coefficient on Post US indicator)
Small Loss Avoidance (ratio of small profits to small losses) 1.750 2.316 3.125 -0.566 0.05
Timely Loss Recognition Statistic
EQ4 Conservatism (Basu regression R*DUM coefficient) 0.273# 0.202# 0.048 0.071 0.40
Value Relevance Statistics (R2 )
EQ5 Price to Accounting Data 0.155 0.206 0.117 -0.051 0.11
EQ6 Good News (Basu regression) 0.002 0.031 -0.067 -0.029 0.33
EQ7 Bad News (Basu regression) 0.125 0.077 0.010 0.047 0.30






Table 7 – Comparison of Earnings Quality post-SOX for ADRs and GDRs (H3) 
 





Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 t-stat
OI 0.124 0.096 0.210 0.029 0.198 0.041 0.020 0.516 -0.125 0.112 1.83
OCF 0.078 0.098 0.116 0.051 0.143 0.033 0.020 0.322 -0.096 0.103 1.64
ACCR -0.050 -0.049 0.075 -0.099 -0.003 -0.074 -0.021 0.228 -0.100 0.020 1.22
EPS 0.041 0.044 0.094 0.013 0.095 -0.006 0.003 0.127 -0.077 0.081 3.60 *
RET 0.219 0.145 0.472 -0.110 0.415 0.411 0.267 0.713 -0.101 0.749 -2.72 *
Control Variables
SIZE 7.478 7.747 2.388 5.258 9.202 4.616 4.693 2.859 3.042 6.742 9.24 *
EQISS 0.202 0.086 0.386 0.000 0.300 0.311 0.312 0.644 -0.0101.000 -1.77
DEBTISS 0.212 0.121 0.423 -0.056 0.475 0.177 0.124 0.664 -0.233 1.000 0.54
LVG 0.457 0.449 0.254 0.243 0.666 0.398 0.398 0.249 0.155 0.613 1.97
AST_TURN 0.589 0.540 0.362 0.311 0.842 0.492 0.397 0.505 0.060 0.645 1.90
SGROW 0.325 0.200 0.373 0.062 0.572 0.169 0.159 0.655 -0.2430.821 2.53 **









*, ** t-test of differences in means significantly different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed); #, ## significantly different from zero at 
0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed). For procedures to calculate bootstrapped p-values, see the Appendix. Bolded statistics indicate higher earnings 
quality. Variable definitions and calculation of earnings quality statistics are available in Table 2. 
  




EQ1 Variability of Operating Income to Operating Cash Flows 0.961 1.191 0.08
EQ2 Correlation of Operating Accruals to Operating Cash Flows -0.351# -0.753# 0.00
Small Loss Avoidance (coefficient on ADR indicator)
Small Loss Avoidance (ratio of small profits to small losses) 5.750 3.000 0.06
Timely Loss Recognition Statistic
EQ4 Conservatism (Basu regression R*DUM coefficient) 0.255## 0.224## 0.46
Value Relevance Statistics (R2 )
EQ5 Price to Accounting Data 0.264 0.081 0.00
EQ6 Good News (Basu regression) 0.080 0.017 0.04
EQ7 Bad News (Basu regression) 0.226 0.099 0.20
EQ3





Table 8 – Comparison of Earnings Quality for GDRs before and after SOX (RQ1) 
 





Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 t-stat
OI 0.041 0.020 0.516 -0.125 0.112 0.331 0.056 0.959 0.000 0.188 -3.10 *
OCF 0.033 0.020 0.322 -0.096 0.103 0.540 0.081 1.507 -0.034 0.187 -3.78 *
ACCR -0.074 -0.021 0.228 -0.100 0.020 -0.589 -0.051 1.717 -0.149 0.018 3.41 *
EPS -0.006 0.003 0.127 -0.077 0.081 0.028 0.019 0.141 0.000 0.074 -2.24 **
RET 0.411 0.267 0.713 -0.101 0.749 0.273 -0.016 0.942 -0.3420.625 1.38
Control Variables
SIZE 4.616 4.693 2.859 3.042 6.742 4.842 5.613 3.690 3.591 7.474 -0.57
EQISS 0.311 0.312 0.644 -0.010 1.000 0.229 0.234 0.761 -0.5921.000 0.97
DEBTISS 0.177 0.124 0.664 -0.233 1.000 0.175 0.181 0.698 -0.300 1.000 0.03
LVG 0.398 0.398 0.249 0.155 0.613 0.432 0.410 0.228 0.231 0.626 -1.15
AST_TURN 0.492 0.397 0.505 0.060 0.645 0.693 0.614 0.475 0.284 0.978 -3.37 *
SGROW 0.169 0.159 0.655 -0.243 0.821 0.199 0.252 0.711 -0.3161.000 -0.39









*, ** t-test of differences in means significantly different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed); #, ## significantly different from zero at 
0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed). For procedures to calculate bootstrapped p-values, see the Appendix. Bolded statistics indicate higher earnings 
quality. Variable definitions and calculation of earnings quality statistics are available in Table 2. 
  




EQ1 Variability of Operating Income to Operating Cash Flows 1.191 2.049 0.00
EQ2 Correlation of Operating Accruals to Operating Cash Flows -0.753# -0.981# 0.00
Small Loss Avoidance (coefficient on Post GDR indicator)
Small Loss Avoidance (ratio of small profits to small losses) 3.000 6.333 0.19
Timely Loss Recognition Statistic
EQ4 Conservatism (Basu regression R*DUM coefficient) 0.224## 0.003 0.02
Value Relevance Statistics (R2 )
EQ5 Price to Accounting Data 0.081 0.177 0.09
EQ6 Good News (Basu regression) 0.017 0.023 0.04
EQ7 Bad News (Basu regression) 0.099 0.004 0.07
EQ3






Table 9 – Comparison of the Change in Earnings Quality around SOX (Post - Pre) for GDRs and Non-Cross-lister  (RQ2) 
 





Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 t-stat
OI 0.015 0.042 0.175 -0.038 0.107 0.015 0.029 0.206 -0.044 0.101 0.00
OCF 0.026 0.066 0.205 -0.057 0.139 0.061 0.072 0.373 -0.075 0.169 -0.96
ACCR -0.059 -0.040 0.129 -0.104 0.013 -0.135 -0.060 0.305 -0.153 0.013 2.64 *
EPS 0.008 0.012 0.137 -0.046 0.074 -0.008 0.008 0.152 -0.0210.052 0.98
RET 0.415 0.209 0.763 -0.145 0.739 0.117 -0.150 0.928 -0.5030.300 2.93 *
Control Variables
SIZE 3.543 3.862 2.916 2.517 5.409 3.597 4.372 3.614 2.933 5.536 -0.14
EQISS 0.111 0.072 0.507 -0.055 0.372 -0.010 0.000 0.600 -0.465 0.213 1.83
DEBTISS 0.124 0.022 0.492 -0.123 0.376 -0.014 0.000 0.588 -0.459 0.309 2.14 **
LVG 0.426 0.449 0.237 0.244 0.600 0.497 0.545 0.230 0.317 0.686 -2.54 **
AST_TURN 0.679 0.609 0.549 0.177 1.037 0.912 0.737 0.677 0.360 1.316 -3.17 *
SGROW 0.126 0.079 0.492 -0.092 0.324 0.023 0.022 0.604 -0.439 0.337 1.57









*, ** t-test of differences in means significantly different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed); #, ## significantly different from zero at 
0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed). For procedures to calculate bootstrapped p-values, see the Appendix. Bolded statistics indicate higher earnings 
quality. Variable definitions and calculation of earnings quality statistics are available in Table 2. 
  
Comparison of the Change in Earnings Quality around SOX (Post - Pre) for GDRs and Non-Cross-listers




EQ1 Variability of Operating Income to Operating Cash Flows 0.881 0.426 -0.857 0.455 0.00
EQ2 Correlation of Operating Accruals to Operating Cash Flows -0.601# -0.678# 0.228 0.077 0.13
Small Loss Avoidance (coefficient on Post NCL indicator)
Small Loss Avoidance (ratio of small profits to small losses) 2.667 2.250 -3.333 0.417 0.15
Timely Loss Recognition Statistic
EQ4 Conservatism (Basu regression R*DUM coefficient) 0.097 0.080 0.221 0.017 0.06
Value Relevance Statistics (R2 )
EQ5 Price to Accounting Data 0.054 0.080 -0.096 -0.026 0.24
EQ6 Good News (Basu regression) 0.006 0.020 -0.006 -0.014 0.37
EQ7 Bad News (Basu regression) 0.025 0.023 0.095 0.002 0.08











*, ** t-test of differences in means significantly different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed); #, ## significantly different from zero at 
0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed). For procedures to calculate bootstrapped p-values, see the Appendix. Bolded statistics indicate higher earnings 
quality. Variable definitions and calculation of earnings quality statistics are available in Table 2. The assignment of high and low investor 
protection for each country follows the assessments by Lang et al. (2006).  I made individual assessments on the following countries that were not 






Comparison of the Change in Earnings Quality around SOX (Post - Pre) for ADRs
ADRs Bootstrap
Earnings Quality Statistic ∆ in Low ∆ in High  p-value
Earnings Management Statistics
EQ1 Variability of Operating Income to Operating Cash Flows -0.501 -0.127 0.01
EQ2 Correlation of Operating Accruals to Operating Cash Flows -0.222 -0.179 0.43
Small Loss Avoidance (coefficient on Post ADR indicator)
Small Loss Avoidance (ratio of small profits to small losses) 2.300 5.500 0.25
Timely Loss Recognition Statistic
EQ4 Conservatism (Basu regression R*DUM coefficient) -0.062 0.125 0.03
Value Relevance Statistics (R2 )
EQ5 Price to Accounting Data 0.183 0.091 0.24
EQ6 Good News (Basu regression) -0.141 0.102 0.10











*, ** t-test of differences in means significantly different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed); #, ## significantly different from zero at 
0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed). For procedures to calculate bootstrapped p-values, see the Appendix. Bolded statistics indicate higher earnings 









Earnings Quality Statistic Pre-Sox Post-Sox Post-Sox  p-value
Earnings Management Statistics
EQ1 Variability of Operating Income to Operating Cash Flows 1.763 0.675 1.138 0.06
EQ2 Correlation of Operating Accruals to Operating Cash Flows -0.987# -0.864# -0.627# 0.02
Small Loss Avoidance (ratio of small profits to small losses) 6.333 3.800 2.000 0.20
Timely Loss Recognition Statistic
EQ4 Conservatism (Basu regression R*DUM coefficient) 0.027 0.292# -0.223 0.00
Value Relevance Statistics (R2 )
EQ5 Price to Accounting Data 0.171 0.121 0.244 0.10
EQ6 Good News (Basu regression) 0.022 0.003 0.087 0.23
EQ7 Bad News (Basu regression) 0.011 0.398 0.135 0.12
EQ3
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